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Silverman: The Search for a Solution to Child Snatching

THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION TO CHILD
SNATCHING
Regarding child kidnaping, the devastating effects of our current policies are clear. We have just not developed sufficient legal
sanctions to prevent a parent from seizing, restraining, or concealing a child from a parent who has legal custody. Very abruptly, a
child can be forced to live in a different place, with a different
person, and because the absconding parent does not want to be
caught, is often forced to move from place to place with no sense of
permanence. Many times a kidnaping parent tries to win affection
and cooperation by making a child believe the other parent does
not want custody. It is obvious that we are allowing the disruption
of innocent children's lives, with the result too often being longterm physical and/or psychological damage.1
Each year thousands of children disappear from their homes
and families. Some children run away, others are kidnaped, many
simply vanish without a trace.' A large percentage of these missing
children, however, can be classified in a unique category-they are
victims of child snatching-they have been abducted from the parent
entitled to legal custody by the parent not entitled to legal custody.'
Child snatching is becoming an epidemic problem among divorced
and separated couples; recent studies estimate that anywhere from
25,0004 to 100,0005 children per year are victims of child snatching.
In response to this growing problem, forty-eight states have adopted
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA)6 and the fed1.

125 CONG. REc. 758 (1979) (remarks of Sen. McGovern).

2. Congress recently enacted the Missing Children Act, Pub. L. No. 97-292, 96 Stat.
1259 (1982) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 534), authorizing the Federal Bureau of Investigation to assist local law authorities in the search for missing children. The Act permits information about missing children to be placed in the National Crime Information Center computer.
See 128 CONG. REC. S13,157 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982) (remarks by Sen. Hatch, Sen. Boren,
and Sen. Thurmond).
3. See 124 CONG. REC. 501 (1978) (statement of Sen. Wallop accompanying Criminal
Code Reform Act of 1977, S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. 498 (1978)).
4. S. 105, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CoNG. REc. 739 (1979).
5. Lauter, Family Law: A New Era of Respect, Nat'l L. J. October 18, 1982 at 1, col. 4,
10, col. 1.
6. The following is a list of the state codifications of the UCCJA: ALA. CODE §§ 30-3-20
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eral government has enacted the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act
of 1980 (PKPA). 7
This note analyzes some of the legal issues inherent in child
snatching. First, it examines the view that child snatching is a judicially created problem.8 The legal system in the United States has
encouraged parents to snatch their own children by not according
full faith and credit' or res judicata status10 to child custody decrees,
to -44 (Cum. Supp. 1981); ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.30.010-.910 (1977); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 8-401 to -424 (Supp. 1981-1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-2701 to -2725 (Cum. Supp.
1981); CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 5150-5174 (West Supp. 1982); CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14-13-101 to
-126 (1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-90 to -114 (Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 §§
1901-1925 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.1302-.1348 (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE §§ 74501 to -525 (Supp. 1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 583-1 to -26 (1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 51001 to -1025 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, §§ 2101-2126 (Smith-Hurd 1980); IND. CODE
§§ 31-1-11.6-1 to -24 (Supp. 1978); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 598A.1-.25 (West 1981); KANSAS
STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1301 to -1326 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.400-.630 (Bobbs-Merrill 1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1700-:1724 (West Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit, 19, §§ 801-825 (1981); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, §§ 184-207 (1981); MICH. COMp. LAWS
ANN. §§ 600.651-.673 (1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 518A.01-.25 (West Supp. 1982); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 93-23-1 to -47 (Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 452.440-.550 (Vernon Supp.
1982); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-7-101 to -125 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-1201 to 1225
(Supp. 1980); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 125A.010-.250 (1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 458-A:1
to -:25 (Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:34-28 to -52 (West Supp. 1981); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 40-10-1 to -24 (Supp. 1982); N.Y. DOm. REL. LAW §§ 75-a to 75-z (McKinney
Cum. Supp. 1982-1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50A-1 to -25 (Cum. Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 14-14-01 to -26 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.21-.37 (Page 1980); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1601-1627 (West Supp. 1981); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.700-.930
(1981); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5341-5366 (Purdon 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-14-1
to -26 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-782 to -830 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. §§ 26-5-5 to -52 (Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-1301 to 1325 (Supp.
1981); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-45c-1 to -26 (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 10311051 (1979); VA. CODE §§ 20-125 to -146 (Supp. 1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
26.27.010-.910 (Supp. 1982); W. VA. CODE §§ 48-10-1 to -26 (Cum. Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 822.01-.25 (West 1977); Wyo. STAT. §§ 20-5-101 to -125 (Supp. 1977).

Texas has adopted two state statutes that are equivalent to certain sections of the
UCCJA: TEX. FAm. CODE ANN. 2 §§ 11.045, 11.053 (Vernon Supp. 1982) (These sections are
equivalent to UCCJA sections 3 and 13 respectively).
Massachusetts has not as yet adopted the UCCJA, but the underlying principles of the
Act have been adopted through judicial decision. See Murphy v. Murphy, 404 N.E.2d 69
(1980). In addition, two bills are currently pending in the Massachusetts legislature to adopt
the Massachusetts Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, modeled after the UCCJA. See S.B. 1534,
8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2325 (Apr. 6, 1982); H.B. 4495, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2353 (Apr.
20, 1982).
Neither the District of Columbia nor Puerto Rico has adopted the UCCJA.
7. Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3566 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (Supp. IV 1980);
42 U.S.C. § 663 (Supp. IV 1980); 18 U.S.C. § 1073 note (Supp. IV 1980)).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 18-62.
9. See Infra text accompanying notes 22-49.
10. [T]he doctrine of res judicata is that an existing final judgment rendered upon

the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, is con-
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and by not developing a set of uniform rules by which a court can
determine whether it can exercise jurisdiction in child custody matters.11 Second, this note examines the development, application, and
effectiveness of both the UCCJA 12 and the PKPA' 3 as statutory
schemes aimed at resolving some of the problems created by the judiciary. Both the UCCJA and the PKPA address the type of recognition and enforcement one state must accord to the custody decrees
of other states. The PKPA extends full faith and credit to custody
decrees that are issued in accordance with the requirements provided
in the statute.1 4 The UCCJA assures recognition and enforcement of
custody decrees through the principle of comity."5 Both statutes create a uniform system for the exercise of a court's jurisdiction in child
custody matters." Unless the court can meet the jurisdictional prerequisites promulgated by each statute, the court will not be able to
exercise jurisdiction to issue a custody decree. Finally, this note focuses on several common law tort actions that are available to the
custodial parent as an alternative
means to redress the injuries in7
curred in child snatching.Y
I.

CHILD SNATCHING: A JUDICIALLY CREATED PROBLEM

The judicial system in the United States has itself encouraged
noncustodial parents to resort to child snatching.' 8 Three factors
have contributed to the escalation in the rate of child snatching.
First, the Supreme Court has not extended the principle of full faith
and credit to child custody decrees. 9 Second, a child custody decree
is not considered res judicata, but rather, is subject to modification
under certain circumstances.2 0 Third, a uniform system for the exerelusive of causes of action and of facts or issues thereby litigated, as to the parties
and their privies, in all other actions in the same or any other judicial tribunal of
concurrent jurisdiction.
46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 394 (1969) (footnotes omitted). See infra text accompanying
notes 49-53.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 54-63.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 64-191.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 192-276.
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (Supp. IV 1980); infra text accompanying notes 201,
210.
15. UCCJA § 13; see infra text accompanying notes 208-09.
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c) (Supp. IV 1980); UCCJA § 3.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 277-99.
18.

See S.

KATZ, CHILD SNATCHING THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO THE ABDUCTION OF

11-13 (1981).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 22-49.

CHILDREN

20.

See infra text accompanying notes 50-53. Although the UCCJA addresses the issue
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cise of a court's jurisdiction in child custody matters was lacking
among the state courts that decided custody disputes.21
A. Full Faith and Credit
The Constitution provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given
in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings
of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings
shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."22 Congress, in turn, has enacted legislation that not only provides for the authentication of
these acts, records, and judicial proceedings, but also declares that
they "shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within
the United States . . . as they have by law or usage in the courts of
23
such State . . . from which they are taken."

The question of whether full faith and credit should be extended
by a state court to custody decrees issued in other states has been
presented to the Supreme Court on five separate occasions; 2 on none
of those occasions did the Supreme Court extend full faith and credit
to custody decrees. In three separate instances,25 the Court invoked
the principle that custody decrees are not res judicata.2 6 In New
York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey,27 and Ford v. Ford,3 the Court held
that a state is neither required to extend full faith and credit to a
custody decree nor bound to enforce it if the decree would not be
considered res judicata in the issuing forum.29 In Kovacs v. Brewer,30
of res judicata, the statute apparently does not alter the existing interpretation of this principle. See UCCJA § 12.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 54-61. The UCCJA and the PKPA have remedied this situation by proposing strict standards by which a court can exercise jurisdiction to
decide a custody matter. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c) (Supp. IV 1980); UCCJA § 3. Historically,
federal courts do not have jurisdiction -to hear and decide domestic relations matters. See
Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1982).
22. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976).
24. Webb v. Webb, 451 U.S. 493 (1981); Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962); Kovacs v.
Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953); New York ex rel
Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
25. Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958); New
York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 49-53.
27. 185 Misc. 52, 55 N.Y.S.2d 761 (Sup. Ct.), affd, 269 A.D. 1019, 59 N.Y.S.2d 396
(Ist Dep't 1945), affd, 295 N.Y. 836, 66 N.E.2d 851 (1946), affd, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
28. 239 S.C. 305, 123 S.E.2d 33 (1961), rev'd, 371 U.S. 187 (1962).
29. See 330 U.S. at 613-15; 371 U.S. at 193-94. For a discussion of the res judicata
effect of custody decrees, see infra text accompanying notes 49-53.
30. 245 N.C. 630, 97 S.E.2d 96 (1957), vacated, 356 U.S. 604 (1958).
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the Court decided that a state court could modify a custody decree
issued in a sister state if the issuing state would not consider the
decree res judicata. 31 Under the common law, a custody decree may
be modified if the court decides that, because of changed circumstances, 2 the child's best interests 3 warrant such a modification.
The Court in Kovacs reasoned that if the issuing forum could modify
a custody decree, the court of another state would also be able to
modify the decree if it too found that circumstances had changed
since the decree had been originally issued. 3 ' The Court decided that
as a general principle, the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution requires only that a state extend the same effect and enforcement to another state's custody decree that it would receive in the
issuing forum. 5 If a custody decree is not res judicata in the issuing
forum, another state "has at least as much leeway to disregard the
judgment, to qualify it, or to depart from it as does the State where
it was rendered."3 6
In May v. Anderson,37 the Court held that an ex parte divorce
and custody decree awarding custody of the children to the resident
parent, issued without personal jurisdiction over the nonresident parent, was not entitled to full faith and credit.3 8 Analogizing the situation in May to divisible divorce, 9 the Court reasoned that a parent's
right to custody was a "personal right" that could not be terminated
by a court unless that court had first obtained personal jurisdiction
over the parent.40 Although full faith and credit can be awarded to a
divorce decree issued without personal jurisdiction over the nonresident spouse, a child custody decree that deprived a parent of custody
31.
32.
33.
34.

356 U.S. at 607-08.
See infra text accompanying notes 51-53.
See infra note 51.
356 U.S. at 608.

35.

Halvey, 330 U.S. at 614.

36.

Id. at 615.

37.

91 Ohio App. 557, 107 N.E.2d 358, appeal dismissed, 157 Ohio St. 436, 105

N.E.2d 648 (1952), rev'd, 345 U.S. 528 (1953) (plurality decision). For a further discussion of
this case, see infra text accompanying notes 172-82.
38. 345 U.S. at 534-35. In the divorce proceeding in Wisconsin, the mother was served
with process pursuant to a Wisconsin long arm statute. This statute specifically applied to
divorces but was silent as to its applicability in custody proceedings. Id. at 531 n.3.
39. See Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948). Under the concept of divisible divorce, an
ex parte divorce decree, issued without personal jurisdiction over the nonresident spouse, would
be entitled to full faith and credit only to the extent that it dissolved the marriage but would
not be recognized or enforced insofar as it terminated the absent spouse's right to financial
support. Id. at 549.
40. May, 345 U.S. at 534.
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and that was issued without personal jurisdiction over the parent is
not entitled to full faith and credit. 1
The Supreme Court, in Webb v. Webb,42 avoided the question of
whether full faith and credit should be extended to custody decrees
by dismissing a writ of certiorari after deciding that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.4 3 The Court lacked jurisdiction to
decide the full faith and credit issue because the petitioner failed to
raise a federal question in the state court below, and, therefore, had
not preserved grounds for an appeal to the Supreme Court. 4 Although noting that the term "full faith and credit" was mentioned
several times in the proceedings, the Court found that the state court
did not decide the case by interpreting the full faith and credit
clause of the federal Constitution, but rather, decided the custody
dispute by interpreting the UCCJA-a state law. 5
This failure of the Supreme Court to extend full faith and credit
to child custody decrees led to instability in custody determinations.
State courts, not bound by the full faith and credit clause, were free
to modify the custody decrees of other states almost at will. 46 State
courts often issued conflicting decrees--one state awarding custody
of the child to the father and another state awarding custody to the
mother.47 Neither parents nor courts could determine which decree to
follow. The courts appear to have encouraged child snatching by
not recognizing and enforcing the decrees of other states and by providing a forum for the relitigation of other states' custody decrees. In
effect, Justice Rutledge's concurring opinion in New York ex rel.
Halvey v. Halvey,'48 became a self-fulfilling prophecy:
The result seems unfortunate in that, apparently, it may make
41. Id. at 533-34. See Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948). For a further discussion of
personal jurisdiction and custody decrees, see infra text accompanying notes 136-91.
42. 245 Ga. 650, 266 S.E.2d 463 (1980), cert. dismissed, 451 U.S. 493 (1981).
43. 451 U.S. at 501-02.
44. Id. at 495. Webb involved conflicting custody decrees. Florida awarded custody of
the child to the mother, Georgia awarded custody to the father. See Webb v. Webb, 245 Ga.
650, 266 S.E.2d 463 (1980).
45. 451 U.S. at 496-98. Additionally, the Court did not find any mention of a federal
question or "full faith and credit" in either the majority or the dissenting opinion written by
the Georgia Supreme Court. Id. at 495. See 245 Ga. 650, 266 S.E.2d 463 (1980).
46. See Commissioners' Prefatory Note, UCCJA, 9 U.L.A. 111, 112 (1979).
47. Id. at 113. See, e.g., Stout v. Pate, 120 Cal. App. 2d 699, 261 P.2d 788 (1953), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 968 (1954); Stout v. Pate, 208 Ga. 768, 69 S.E.2d 576 (1952), affd, 209 Ga.
786, 75 S.E.2d 748 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 968 (1954); Webb v. Webb, 245 Ga. 650,
266 S.E.2d 463 (1980), cert. dismissed, 451 U.S. 493 (1981).
48. 330 U.S. 610 (1947).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol11/iss3/7

6

Silverman: The Search for a Solution to Child Snatching
CHILD SNATCHING

1983]

possible a continuing round of litigation over custody, perhaps also
of abduction, between alienated parents. That consequence hardly
can be thought conducive to the child's welfare. And, if possible, I
would avoid such a distressing result, since I think that the controlling consideration should be the best interests of the child, not only
for disposing of such cases as a matter of local policy, . . . but also
for formulating federal policies of full faith and credit as well as of
jurisdiction and due process in relation to such dispositions.4 9

B. Res Judicata
Closely related to the full faith and credit issue is the question
of whether a custody decree is considered res judicata. Custody decrees are usually not considered final decrees and can be freely modified by the issuing state. 50 The issuing forum may modify a custody
decree upon a showing that, because of a change in circumstances,
the child's best interests 1 require a modification in custody; changes
in circumstances' arising after the issuance of the decree or factors
existing at the time of the custody determination that had not been
brought to the court's attention, might be sufficient to warrant a
modification of the custody decree. 52 If a custody decree is subject to
modification in the issuing forum, the courts of a sister state, not
bound by the full faith and credit clause, would be free to modify
that custody decree if it too found that changed circumstances warranted a different custody arrangement.53
C.

Lack of Standards

Child snatching has also been encouraged by the lack of uniform jurisdictional standards among the various state courts.54 Historically, there were three basic standards by which courts exercised
49. Id. at 619-20 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
50. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, § 17.7, at
598 (1968). See also Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962); New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey,
330 U.S. 610 (1947).
51. Courts determine custody in accordance with the best interests of the child. In making this determination, courts examine various factors that include, but are not limited to: The
wishes of the child; the interrelationship of the child and his parents or parent; the wishes of
the parents as to custody; the child's relationship with siblings and other persons who might
have an effect on the child; the child's adjustment to his home, his school, and the community
in which he resides; and the physical and mental health of all individuals involved in the custody matter. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 197-98 (1979).
52. H. CLARK, supra note 50, § 17.7, at 600.
53. See Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958). See infra text accompanying notes 10535.
54. See generally S. KATZ, supra note 18, at 11-13.
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jurisdiction in custody disputes: the domicile of the child,5 5 personal
jurisdiction over the contestants for custody, 56 and the physical pres57
ence of the child within the state.
In those states in which the mere physical presence of the child
was enough to confer jurisdiction on the court to issue a custody
decree, the person having physical possession of the child had a tremendous tactical advantage for litigation. Thus, the present physical
custodian of the child was almost always assured of gaining a
favorable custody determination. A parent who had been denied the
custody of the child at an earlier proceeding might resort to child
snatching in order to obtain physical custody of the child. 58 Once the
parent had physical possession of the child, that parent could then go
into a jurisdiction where mere physical presence of the child was
enough to confer jurisdiction on the court and petition that court for
a change in custody. Since custody decrees could be freely modified
upon a showing of changed circumstances,59 usually all the parent
need do was demonstrate to the court that because of changed circumstances, the child's best interests required a modification of custody. Regardless of how minute the contact among the child, the
parent, and the forum, if the court felt that the child's best interests
required the state to exercise jurisdiction to change the existing custody arrangement and that the court could issue a custody decree
that would be effective, that court would exercise jurisdiction and
modify the prior decree."0 It appeared that the law of custody determinations had become a rule of "seize-and-run."6 l Thus, the legal
system itself added impetus to child snatching. Because a custody
decree is not considered res judicata, the Supreme Court held that
these decrees were not entitled to full faith and credit.62 Since the
courts in one state were not bound by the Constitution to enforce the
custody decrees of other states, they were free to modify any custody
decree at will. Since no uniform guidelines existed for a court to
55. H. CLARK, supra note 50, § 11.5, at 321. "The traditional definition of domicile is
that it refers to a person's 'true, fixed, permanent home, and principal establishment, and to
which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning.'" Id. § 4.1, at 144. A child's
domicile is the same as his parents, or after a divorce, the same as the parent who has been
awarded custody by the court. S. KATz, supra note 18, at 13.
56. H. CLARK, supra note 50, § 11.5, at 321.
57. Id.
58. Commissioners' Prefatory Note, supra note 46, at 113.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 49-53.
60. H. CLARK, supra note 50, § 11.5, at 320-21.
61. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 542 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
62. See cases cited supra note 24 and text accompanying notes 25-36.
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exercise jurisdiction in a custody dispute, courts were free to conduct
a custody hearing despite the presence of only minimal contacts with
the child and the litigants. This led to an increase in the rate of child
abductions by the noncustodial parent and a concomitant increase in
3
the number of relitigations of custody decrees in different forums.

II.

THE UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION

ACT

In response to the multiple litigations of custody decrees in different states and their often inconsistent results, and in an effort to
curb the growing rate of child abductions by the noncustodial parent, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws promulgated the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(UCCJA) in 1968.4 The general purposes of the UCCJA are: to
avoid jurisdictional conflicts between state courts in matters relating
to custody decisions; to promote cooperation between state courts so
that a custody decree will be issued by the state most competent to
decide the child's best interests; to deter the abduction of children in
order to obtain a more favorable custody award; to avoid the relitigation of a custody decree in a second forum; and to facilitate the
enforcement and recognition of custody decrees in other states.6 5 The
UCCJA attempts to remedy the "defects" in custody determinations
caused by the judicial system, particularly, the failure of the Supreme Court to extend full faith and credit to custody decrees and
the absence of a uniform system of jurisdiction for those courts that
render custody determinations.6 "
To accomplish these goals and to simplify interstate custody disputes, the UCCJA establishes a uniform method by which the courts
in a state that has adopted the Act can exercise jurisdiction to issue
a custody decree.6 7 The UCCJA also provides that an out-of-state
custody decree will be recognized and enforced in a second state,
provided that the decree originally was issued in accordance with the
jurisdictional prerequisites of the UCCJA. 8 The Act awards a pref63. See generally Commissioners' Prefatory Note, supra note 46, at 111-13.
64. Commissioners' Prefatory Note, supra note 46, at 113-14. See generally Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative Remedy For Children
Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1207 (1969).

65. UCCJA § 1.
66. See Commissioners' Prefatory Note, supra note 46, at 114; Bodenheimer, supra note
64, at 1216-20; Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody: Initial Jurisdiction and Continuing Jurisdiction Under the UCCJA, 14 FAM. L. Q. 203, 204-05 (1981).
67.

UCCJA § 3.

68.

Id. § 13.
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erence to the continuing jurisdiction of the decree-issuing forum, as
long as that state meets the conditions for continuing jurisdiction
provided in the Act. 9 Finally, the UCCJA denies a forum to a petitioner for either an initial decree or the modification of an existing
decree if the petitioner has abducted the child in order to litigate the
custody issue in a different forum.7
A. JurisdictionalRequirements of the UCCJA
Under the UCCJA, a court that is competent under state law to
decide child custody matters would have jurisdiction to issue a custody decree if any one of the following four tests is met: (1) the
"home state" test-where the state is the child's home state 1 either
at the time the proceeding is commenced or within six months prior
to the start of the custody proceeding, and the child is not present in
the forum because of his abduction or retention by someone claiming
custody, and one parent still remains in the state,72 or (2) the "significant connection and substantial evidence" test-where the child
and at least one parent have a significant connection with the forum
and substantial evidence about the child's care and training is present in the forum,7 3 or (3) the "parens patriae" test-where the state
must assume emergency jurisdiction because the child is either physically abandoned in the state or had been exposed to or threatened
with abuse, neglect, or mistreatment,7 4 or (4) the "necessity"
test-where there is no other state that would be able to satisfy the
enumerated jurisdictional requirements of the UCCJA, or another
state that could have exercised jurisdiction consistent with the Act
has declined to do so because the forum state is a more appropriate
place to decide the custody issue and the child's best interests re69. Id.§ 14.
70. Id. § 8.
71. Home state is defined in the UCCJA as:
[T]he state in which the child immediately preceding the time involved lived with
his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least 6 consecutive months,
and in the case of a child less than 6 months old the state in which the child lived
from birth with any of the persons mentioned. Periods of temporary absence of any
of the named persons are counted as part of the 6-month or other period.
Id. § 2(5).
72. Id.§ 3(a)(l).
73. Id.§ 3(a)(2).
74. Id. § 3(a)(3). For the exercise of emergency jurisdiction in a case of child snatching,
see Vorphal v. Lee, 99 Wis. 2d 7, 298 N.W.2d 222 (1980)(The court properly exercised emergency jurisdiction even though the children were physically present before the court as a result
of their abduction by their mother who took the children from the father's custody because he
had abused and mistreated them.)
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quire that the forum exercise jurisdiction. 5 Although four separate
bases for the exercise of a court's jurisdiction are provided, jurisdiction that is based on either the home state test or the significant
connection and substantial evidence test is preferable. 6 Under the
UCCJA, the mere physical presence of the child in the forum, except in the exercise of emergency jurisdiction or the absence of another forum, is insufficient, by itself, to confer jurisdiction on the
court. 77 Conversely,8 the child's physical presence, while desirable, is
7
not a prerequisite.
In order to achieve its goals of stability in child custody arrangements, to avoid both forum shopping 79 and jurisdictional competition among the various states, and to deter child snatching,80 the
UCCJA sets forth strict standards by which an existing custody decree can be modified in a different state. The UCCJA provides that:
If a court of another state has made a custody decree, a court
of this State shall not modify that decree unless (1) it appears to
the court of this State that the court which rendered the decree
does not now have jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites
substantially in accordance with this Act or has declined to assume
jurisdiction to modify the decree and (2) the court of this State has
jurisdiction.81
Thus, the UCCJA grants almost exclusive continuing jurisdiction to
the state that first issued the custody decree, provided that that court
can exercise jurisdiction under the standards provided by the
UCCJA. 2 All petitions for the modification of a custody decree
must be addressed to the decree-issuing state as long as that state
maintains sufficient contact with at least one of the litigants. It is
only when all of the involved parties no longer reside in the decreeissuing forum that jurisdiction to modify a custody decree would
shift to another state that could meet the jurisdictional requirements
of the UCCJA.88
Under the jurisdictional requirements of the UCCJA, a court
may exercise jurisdiction in a custody matter after the child has re75. UCCJA § 3(a)(4).
76. Id. § 3 Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 123 (1979).
77. UCCJA § 3(b).
78. Id. § 3(c). See also Bodenheimer, supra note 64, at 1223-24.
79. UCCJA § 14 Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 154 (1979).
80. UCCJA § 1(a)(1),(5).
81. Id. § 14(a) (emphasis added).
82. Id. § 14 Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 154 (1979).
83. Id.
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sided in the state for at least six months prior to the commencement
of the proceeding.84 Under these circumstances, it would appear that
a parent, who snatches his own child and then resides with the child
in a state for at least six months, could petition the court, after the
expiration of that six month period, for the modification of an existing custody decree. The parent could then claim that the forum
has jurisdiction not only as the child's home state but also as a state
with significant connections to the child and parent. The parent
might also claim that the contacts between the child and the decreeissuing state have so weakened that the original state no longer can
exercise jurisdiction over the custody matter consistent with the
UCCJA's requirements.
The Supreme Court of Oregon in In re Custody of Ross,85 rejected such an argument. Ross involved a proceeding by the mother
to enforce a Montana custody decree in Oregon after the child had
been snatched and concealed in Oregon by the father for approximately twenty months.86 The Oregon trial court denied enforcement
of the Montana decree, ordered a new custody hearing, and awarded
the father custody of the child.17 The trial court found that two bases existed for its exercise of jurisdiction. First, Oregon was now the
child's home state because the child resided in the state for more
than six months. Second, the child had a significant connection with
the state and substantial evidence concerning the child's care and
training existed there. 88 Although the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's findings, 89 the Oregon Supreme Court reversed the decision and enforced the Montana decree. 90
In deciding whether Montana had continuing jurisdiction over
-its decree, the Oregon Supreme Court applied the significant connection and subst: ntial evidence test of jurisdiction. 9' The court had no
84. Id. § 3(a)(l).
85. 47 Or. App. 631, 614 P.2d 1225 (1980), rev'd, 291 Or. 263, 630 P.2d 353 (1981).
86. The father took the child from Montana prior to the couple's divorce. The mother
subsequently obtained a divorce in Montana and a decree awarding her custody of the child.
291 Or. at 265-66, 630 P.2d at 354-55.
87. Id. at 266, 630 P.2d at 355.
88. Id. at 273 n.13, 630 P.2d at 359 n.13 (text of the trial court's oral opinion).
89. In re Custody of Ross, 47 Or. App. 631, 614 P.2d 1225 (1980) (Montana could no
longer exercise jurisdiction because it had no significant connections with the child nor was it
the child's home state).
90. 291 Or. at 281, 630 P.2d at 364.
91. See supra text accompanying note 73. The Oregon Supreme Court acknowledged
the fact that after the passage of six months, the forum state could become the child's home
state. 291 Or. at 270-71, 630 P.2d at 358.
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difficulty in concluding that substantial evidence concerning the
child still existed in Montana and that the mother still maintained a
significant connection with that state.92 The court only had to determine whether, after an absence of twenty months, the child retained
the type of significant connection with Montana that would satisfy
the UCCJA's requirements for a state's exercise of continuing jurisdiction. The court concluded that the child still had a significant
connection with Montana even if the connection was based primarily
on the mother's residence there since "the relationship between
mother and child is itself a significant [connection]."3 The court

noted that implementation of the UCCJA's deterrence policy could
not be effective if the decree-issuing state's jurisdiction was allowed
to expire after the passage of a mere six months.94
By recognizing that the mere passage of time neither automatically confers jurisdiction on the forum state 5 nor breaks the connection between the child and the decree-issuing forum, 96 courts may
provide a deterrent to child snatching. A parent who takes the child
in violation of an existing custody decree and resides in a different
state for six months in the hopes that custody can be relitigated may
find the court unwilling to exercise jurisdiction. The snatching parent's only recourse would be to return to the decree-issuing state and
to attempt to relitigate the custody issue there. A parent with knowledge of these potential difficulties may turn first to the issuing forum. As long as one parent remains a resident of the decree-issuing
state, the courts in another state can find that the child retains a
92.

291 Or. at 275, 630 P.2d at 360. To reach this conclusion, the court noted that since

the child was born in Montana and resided there until her abduction, there was a significant
amount of evidence in that state regarding the child's care. In addition, the child's mother and

sibling still resided in Montana.
93. Id. at 276, 630 P.2d at 361. The court, however, did delineate additional factors that
supported its conclusion of a significant connection. See supra note 92.
94. 291 Or. at 276, 630 P.2d at 361. However, the court also recognized that with each
day following an abduction, the connection with the decree-issuing state grows weaker. Ulti-

mately, it is possible for the decree-issuing state to lose jurisdiction to modify or enforce its
own custody decree in a child snatching situation. See id., 630 P.2d at 361. The court explic-

itly limited its decision to the facts of the case, i.e., a 21 month abduction and concealment
will not divest the decree state of jurisdiction. Id. at 279, 630 P.2d at 363.

95.

Id. at 276, 630 P.2d at 361. See Allison v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County,

99 Cal. App. 3d 993, 160 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1979); Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform
Child Custody JurisdictionAct and Remaining Problems: Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody,
and Excessive Modifications, 65 CALIF. L. REv. 978, 988-89 (1977).
96. Ross, 291 Or. at 276, 630 P.2d at 361. See Bodenheimer, supra note 66, at 214-15;
UCCJA § 14 Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 154 (1979).
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significant connection with that state. 97 This would enable the original-decree state to exercise continuing jurisdiction over the custody
matter;"' a court in a second forum will have no choice but to decline jurisdiction. This may add to the UCCJA's deterrence of child
snatching since the abducting parent will have no place to relitigate
the matter except in the original decree-issuing state.
B.

"Clean Hands" and the UCCJA

The UCCJA codified the equitable doctrine of "clean hands" 99

in order to further its policies of deterring child snatching. 100 When
a petitioner for an initial custody decree has wrongfully 0 1 removed

the child from one state, a court may decline to exercise jurisdiction.
In those situations where a custody decree has not been rendered in
any state and a parent removes the child from one state and at-

tempts to litigate custody as an initial matter in a different state,
that court, even though able to exercise jurisdiction under the

UCCJA's requirements, 0 2 has the discretion to refuse to hear the
custody petition, as long as the child's best interests would not be

jeopardized by the court's refusal of jurisdiction.103 However, the
97. See Ross, 291 Or. at 276, 630 P.2d at 361; UCCJA § 14 Commissioners' Note, 9
U.L.A. 154 (1979). Cf. UCCJA §§ 3(a)-(b), 14 (Discussing respectively: (i) the home state
and the significant connection and substantial evidence tests of jurisdiction; and (ii) modification jurisdiction).
98. See UCCJA § 14 Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 154 (1979); Bodenheimer, supra
note 66, at 214-15.
99. Under this doctrine "'He who comes into equity must come with clean hands.'" D.
DoBBs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.4, at 45 (1973). A person coming to an
equity court seeking relief for some claim will be denied a remedy if that person has unclean
hands. "It is only when the plaintiff's improper conduct is the source, . . . of his equitable
claim, that he is to be barred because of this conduct." Id. at 46.
100. UCCJA § 8.
101. Under the clean hands provision of the UCCJA, "wrongful" does not mean that a
custody "right" has been violated. If there has been no custody determination rendered by a
court, both parents have a right to custody of the child. The taking of a child by one parent
prior to the issuance of a custody decree, therefore, violates no legal "right". However, the
taking of the child is "wrongful" in the sense that "one party's conduct is so objectionable that
a court in the exercise of its inherent equity powers cannot in good conscience permit that
party access to its jurisdiction." UCCJA § 8 Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 142-43 (1979).
102. See supra text accompanying notes 71-75.
103. See Stevens v. Stevens, 177 N.J. Super. 167, 425 A.2d 1081 (App. Div. 1981) (The
mother removed the child from Arizona in September, 1979, and brought him to New Jersey
prior to any divorce or custody hearing in Arizona. On the same day, the father obtained an
injunction prohibiting the removal of the child from Arizona. Arizona awaraed him custody of
the child in 1980. New Jersey dismissed the mother's petition for a custody hearing because,
by violating the Arizona injunction, the mother engaged in the type of reprehensible conduct
the UCCJA is attempting to curtail.)
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UCCJA also provides for mandatory denial of jurisdiction if a custody decree has been violated:
Unless required in the interest of the child, the court shall not
exercise its jurisdiction to modify a custody decree of another state
if the petitioner, without consent of the person entitled to custody,
has improperly removed the child from the physical custody of the
person entitled to custody or has improperly retained the child af1°4
ter a visit or other temporary relinquishment of physical custody.

The application of the clean hands doctrine provides additional
deterrence to child snatching. If courts refuse to allow a snatching
parent to relitigate custody in their forum, a parent would have to go
to the state that originally issued the custody decree. If the noncus-

todial parent knows that his only hope for obtaining custody of the
child lies in a modification proceeding in the original forum, he may
first resort to the proper legal channels, i.e., a petition for modification of custody based on changed circumstances presented to the decree-issuing forum, before resorting to child snatching.
C.

The Child's Best Interests and The Court's Discretion

Under the UCCJA, a court is given discretion to base its jurisdictional decision on an assessment of the child's best interests. 105
The court will have to determine whether the child will be harmed
more by the denial of jurisdiction than by the actual abduction by
the parent.106 The court's dilemma is intensified when the child has
been with the abducting parent for an extended period of time. The
courts in New York, 107 New Jersey,10 8 and California 09 have all
104. UCCJA § 8(b) (emphasis added). See, e.g., Etzion v. Evans, 247 Ga. 390, 276
S.E.2d 577 (1981); litigated in New York sub nom. Evans v. Evans, 112 Misc. 2d 537, 447
N.Y.S.2d 200 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (Courts in Georgia and Israel denied the father a forum to
relitigate custody because he had snatched the child twice).
105. See UCCJA §§ 3(a)(2), 7(c), 8(b).
106. UCCJA § 8 Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 143 (1979). It must be noted that the
psychological effects of child snatching on the abducted child can be significant. Divorce in
general and child snatching in particular can rob the child of the foundation of trust and
security that is so important in the early years. See generally L. STONE & J. CHURCH, CHILDHOOD & ADOLESCENCE: PSYCHOLOGY OF THE GROWING PERSON 101-12, 532 (3d ed. 1973).
The fear, helplessness, and confusion that besiege a child who is constantly being moved from
parent to parent or from town to town can sometimes be extremely traumatic. See generally
Child-Snatching Called Threat to Children's Psyches, Lawyers' Survival, 8 FANI. L. REP.
(BNA) 2702-04 (Sept. 28, 1982).
107. In re Susanne U.N.N. v. Rudolf 0.0., 57 A.D.2d 653, 393 N.Y.S.2d 472 (3d
Dep't), affid sub nom. In re Nehra v. Uhlar, 43 N.Y.2d 242, 372 N.E.2d 4, 401 N.Y.S.2d 168
(1977).
108. Van Haren v. Van Haren, 171 N.J. Super. 12, 407 A.2d 1242 (App. Div. 1979);
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held that the child should be returned to the custodial parent.
In In re Nehra v. Uhlar,110 the New York Court of Appeals
determined that two abducted children would not suffer irreparable
harm if they were returned to their father's custody, despite the fact
that they had been snatched by their mother four years earlier.,,
The Court of Appeals determined that, as in all custody matters, the children's best interests must be protected." 2 The court
noted that, whenever possible, the "continual shifting of custody
1s
from one parent to another is to be avoided."
Recognizing that any change in custody might be temporarily
disruptive to the children, the court decided that this factor alone
was not dispositive. 1 The Nehra court proposed a hierarchy of factors for courts to consider when making custody determinations in
similar situations:
Priority, not as an absolute but as a weighty factor, should, in
the absence of extraordinary circumstances, be accorded to the first
custody awarded in litigation or by voluntary agreement. Similarly
qualified priority should also be accorded to the judgment of the
court of greatest concern with the welfare of the children, that is,
the court of domicile, residence, and legal dissolution of the sundered marriage. Denigrated in rank should be the consequences of
child-snatching, flight from the courts of jurisdiction, and defiance
of legal process and judgments. Denigrated in rank, to some degree, should also be the natural or manipulated 'satisfaction' of
see Infra note 117. But see Nehra v. Uhlar, 168 N.J. Super. 187, 402 A.2d 264 (App. Div.),
certif denied, 81 N.J. 413, 408 A.2d 807 (1979); see infra note 117.
109. In re Marriage of Hopson, 110 Cal. App. 3d 884, 168 Cal. Rptr. 345 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1980). For a further discussion of this case, see infra note 117 and text accompanying
notes 124-34.
110. 43 N.Y.2d 242, 372 N.E.2d 4, 401 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1977). Although this case was
litigated subsequent to the passage of the UCCJA in the New York legislature, it was decided
in the Court of Appeals prior to the effective date of the Act in New York. The Court of
Appeals, nevertheless, applied the principles and policies of the UCCJA in rendering its decision. See 43 N.Y.2d at 249-50, 372 N.E.2d at 7-8, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 172.
111. 43 N.Y.2d at 251-52, 372 N.E.2d at 9, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 173. In Nehra, a Michigan court awarded custody of the children to the father. The mother snatched them and took
them to New York where the Family Court awarded her custody. Id. at 246-47, 372 N.E.2d at
5-6, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 170. The family court decision was reversed by the New York Appellate
Division. 57 A.D.2d 653, 393 N.Y.S.2d 472 (3d Dep't 1977). The mother and children then
moved to New Jersey where she instituted custody proceedings while a further appeal was
pending in the New York Court of Appeals. New Jersey stayed its proceedings until New
York rendered its decision. 43 N.Y.2d at 247, 372 N.E.2d at 6, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 170.
112. 43 N.Y.2d at 246, 372 N.E.2d at 5, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 169.
113. Id. at 250, 372 N.E.2d at 8, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 172 (citations omitted).
114. Id. at 248, 372 N.E.2d at 7, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 171.
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young abducted children with the homes where they presently
abide. 115

The court determined that the mere fact that the children had
resided with the mother for over four years was insufficient to qualify as a change in circumstances that would warrant a modification
of the original custody decree; 1 ' the children were returned to the
father pursuant to the original decree.' 17
Returning the snatched child to the custodial parent, even after
the child had been held by the noncustodial parent for several years,
provides an additional deterrent to child snatching. A parent might
snatch a child with the hope that, after a few years, a court will
recognize that circumstances have changed sufficiently to nullify the

original custody decree and award custody to the abducting parent.11 8 The courts, however, by returning the child to the custodial
parent, put the noncustodial parent on notice that he or she cannot
abduct the child and retain him in violation of a valid custody decree
115. Id. at 251, 372 N.E.2d at 9, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 173.
116. Id. at 250, 372 N.E.2d at 8, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 172.
117. Id. at 251-52, 372 N.E.2d at 9, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 173. New Jersey, however, disagreed with the New York Court of Appeals. In Nehra v. Uhlar, 168 N.J. Super. 187, 402
A.2d 264 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 81 N.J. 413, 408 A.2d 807 (1979), the court reversed a
lower court decision awarding custody of the children to the father. The court reasoned that
the children's best interests required that a full custody hearing be held in New Jersey since
almost nine years had passed since the Michigan custody decree had been originally issued. Id.
at 194, 402 A.2d at 268. The court also noted that psychological studies of the children indicated that their return to the custody of their father may have an adverse effect on their
development. Id. at 196, 402 A.2d at 268.
In In re Marriage of Hopson, 110 Cal. App. 3d 884, 168 Cal. Rptr. 345 (Dist. Ct. App.
1980), the California court agreed with the New York Court of Appeals and applied the principles outlined in Nehra, 43 N.Y.2d 242, 372 N.E.2d 4, 401 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1977). In Hopson,
the court determined that the children should be returned to the custody of the mother pursuant to an Arizona custody decree, despite the fact that the children had been living with their
father in Tennessee for approximately seventeen months following their abduction. 110 Cal.
App. 3d at 906, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 360. For a further discussion of this case, see infra text
accompanying notes 124-34.
New Jersey, in Van Haren v. Van Haren, 171 N.J. Super. 12, 407 A.2d 1242 (App. Div.
1979), a case involving a "double snatch", returned custody of the children to the parent who
was awarded custody under the original decree. The mother was originally awarded temporary
custody of the children by a New Jersey court. The father then snatched the children and
obtained a custody decree in South Carolina. The mother then resnatched the children and
brought them to New Jersey. The father sought enforcement of the South Carolina decree in
New Jersey, but the court denied recognition of that decree. Id. at 15-16, 407 A.2d at 124344. A custody hearing was held in New Jersey and custody was awarded to the mother. This
decision was affirmed on appeal with the court deciding that the children's best interests would
be served by awarding custody to the mother. Id. at 22-23, 407 A.2d at 1247.
118. See Nehra, 43 N.Y.2d at 250, 372 N.E.2d at 8, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 172.
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and then expect to win legal custody of the child. 119
D. Full Faith and Credit and the UCCJA
The Supreme Court's refusal to extend full faith and credit to
child custody decrees, thereby denying the recognition and enforcement of these decrees in all courts of the United States, has been one
of the factors contributing to the increase in child snatching.12 0 The
drafters of the UCCJA sought to remedy this situation by providing
for the recognition and enforcement of an out-of-state custody decree
in those states that have adopted the UCCJA under the principle of
comity, 21 rather than as an extension of the full faith and credit
clause.1 22 The UCCJA provides:
The courts of this State shall recognize and enforce an initial
or modification decree of a court of another state which had assumed jurisdiction under statutory provisions substantially in accordance with this Act or which was made under factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of the Act, so long as
this decree has not been modified in accordance with123jurisdictional
standards substantially similar to those of this Act.
When presented with a petition to enforce an out-of-state custody decree, the court must examine all of the factual circumstances
of the case to determine whether the UCCJA's requirements have
been met. In In re Marriage of Hopson,124 the California Court of
Appeals had to decide which, if either, of two outstanding and conflicting custody decrees should be recognized and enforced. Arizona
originally awarded custody of the children to the mother. After the
mother and children moved to California, the father petitioned the
Arizona court for a modification of the custody decree.1 25 While the
119. However, there may be certain situations where the court may not have any other
alternative but to award custody of the child to the snatching parent, as in the case where the
custodial parent is not fit to care for the child or cannot provide an adequate home for the
child, or where the child has been held by the snatching parent for an extremely long time. Id.
at 250-51, 372 N.E.2d at 8, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 172-73.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 22-49.
121. Comity is the doctrine by which the courts of one state will grant "deference, respect, and, occasionally, recognition, to the decrees of another state's courts." S. KATZ, supra
note 18, at 55.
122. See UCCJA § 13.
123. Id. (emphasis added). See UCCJA § 13 Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 151
(1979).
124. 110 Cal. App. 3d 884, 168 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1980).
125. Id. at 889, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 349. The Arizona decree prohibited the removal of the
children without the court's permission. Id.
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proceeding was pending, he snatched the children from California
and took them to Tennessee where he instituted custody proceedings
within four days. 126 One year after the children were snatched, the
Tennessee court, fully aware of the Arizona decree and the father's
conduct in bringing the children to Tennessee, held a full custody
hearing and found that the children's best interests required that
they remain in their father's custody. 127 Both parents then sought to
enforce their respective decrees in California. The California Superior Court28 accorded full faith and credit to the Tennessee
1
judgment.
The California Court of Appeals, however, after examining the
circumstances surrounding the custody award in Tennessee, reversed
the decision and recognized the Arizona decree. 129 The California
court was compelled under its own law to apply the UCCJA even
though the UCCJA had not been adopted in Tennessee at the time
the father instituted the custody proceeding.130 California denied
recognizing the Tennessee decree on two basic grounds. First, Tennessee failed to meet any of the jurisdictional requirements of the
UCCJA.'3a Second, Tennessee should have applied the clean hands
doctrine and refused to exercise jurisdiction. 3 2 Because Tennessee
violated several provisions of the UCCJA, California neither recognized nor enforced that state's decree.' 33 Since Arizona had already
126. Id. at 890, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 350. Arizona subsequently dismissed the father's proceeding and granted the mother permission to move to California with the children. Id.
127. Id. Tennessee was also aware that California had charged the father with the crime
of felony child stealing at the time it rendered its decision. Id.
128. Id. at 891, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
129. Id. at 907, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
130. Id. at 902, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
131. Id. at 894-95, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 352-53. Tennessee was not the children's home
state when the action was commenced in that state in October, 1977. The children had lived in
California for eight months before the action in Tennessee was begun. The children were only
present in Tennessee for four days. California and not Tennessee was the children's home
state. Id. at 890, 894, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 350, 352. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
The California court, however, recognized that technically Tennessee might have been
able to meet the significant connection and substantial evidence test of jurisdiction since the
children and the father had lived in Tennessee for seventeen months before the actual custody
hearing was held in Tennessee in March, 1979. 110 Cal. App. 3d at 895, 168 Cal. Rptr. at
353. See supra text accompanying note 73.
132. 110 Cal. App. 3d at 890, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 355. See UCCJA § 8; supra text
accompanying notes 99-105.
133. In addition to failing to meet the jurisdictional requirements of Section 3 of the
UCCJA and not applying the clean hands doctrine of Section 8, Tennessee also violated other
sections of the UCCJA including Section 6, which requires a court to stay or dismiss its proceeding if a custody proceeding is pending in another jurisdiction and to communicate with the
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adopted the UCCJA and had issued the original custody decree consistent with its provisions, recognition of that state's decree was
mandatory in California.13
The UCCJA has attempted to close the gaps left open by the
Supreme Court's denial of full faith and credit to custody decrees.
By insuring that under certain circumstances a custody decree will
be recognized and enforced in another forum, the UCCJA may deter
child snatching. By virtually guaranteeing that a prior custody decree will be enforced, courts are denying a forum to snatching parents to relitigate the custody issue. Even if an abducting parent is
able to relitigate custody successfully in a different forum, that decree will not be recognized or enforced in a state that is governed by
the UCCJA.
E. Due Process and the UCCJA
In a plurality decision in May v. Anderson,1 35 the Supreme
Court held that a custody decree issued by a court that had not first
obtained personal jurisdiction over a nonresident parent was not entitled to full faith and credit in the court of another state."3 ' The due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment limits a state court's jurisdictional power to enter a judgment affecting the rights and interests of a nonresident litigant1 3 ' to those situations in which personal
jurisdiction is first obtained. The Supreme Court has determined
that satisfaction of due process "requires only that in order to subject a [nonresident] defendant to a [personal] judgment.

. .

he have

certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
court in another forum so that both courts can determine which is the more appropriate forum
to decide the custody issue. UCCJA § 6(a), (c); see 110 Cal. App. 3d at 900, 168 Cal. Rptr.
at 356-57.
134. 110 Cal. App. 3d at 902-03, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 357-58. California also ordered that
a new, full custody hearing be held to protect the best interests of the children since circumstances had changed since the Arizona decree had originally been issued. Id. at 903, 168 Cal.
Rptr. at 358. California determined that it was the best place to hold the hearing because
Arizona no longer had any jurisdiction over the matter. Even though there is a presumption of
a state's continuing jurisdiction over its own custody decrees, the ties with Arizona had been
broken. None of the litigants involved had lived in Arizona for over three years. Arizona could
not meet either the home state test or the significant connection and substantial evidence tests
of jurisdiction. Id.
135. 345 U.S. 528 (1953) (plurality opinion).
136. Id. at 533-34.
137. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978); U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, §
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justice.' "138 Minimum contacts have been defined as "some act by
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits
and protection of its laws." 139 Due process also requires that a defendant be given notice reasonably calculated, under all of the circumstances involved in the case, to give actual notice to all interested
parties that an action is pending and to afford them an opportunity
to be present and heard during the litigation. 40
In Kulko v. Superior Court,141 the Supreme Court applied these
principles to the area of family law. The Kulkos were married in
California; at the time of the marriage both parties were residents
and domiciliaries of New York. 142 The couple lived in New York
after the marriage and remained residents until their separation; the
wife then moved to California. 43 Pursuant to a Haitian divorce decree, the father was granted custody of the children during the
school year; the mother was granted custody during school holidays
and summer vacation.144 Granting his daughter's request, the father
permitted her to live with the mother in California during the school
year. The couple's other child moved to California without the father's acquiescence. One month later the mother sued her ex-husband in California for custody and child support.145
Although the father did not contest California's jurisdiction to
litigate the custody issue, he appeared specially146 to contest the
court's in personam jurisdiction regarding the support issue.1 47 The
Supreme Court held that California lacked personal jurisdiction over
138. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
139. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
140. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950).
141. 63 Cal. App. 3d 417, 133 Cal. Rptr. 627 (1976), vacated, 19 Cal. 3d 514, 564 P.2d
353, 138 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1977), rev'd, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
142. 436 U.S. at 86-87. The marriage took place during the husband's three day stop-

over during a military tour of duty. Id. at 86.
143.

Id. at 87.

144. Id. The divorce decree incorporated their New York separation agreement. The
husband also agreed to pay the wife child support for the time that the children were in her
custody. Id.
145. Id. at 87-88.

146. A special appearance is not regarded as an appearance in court for all purposes. It
is an appearance made in court solely for the purpose of contesting the court's personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 6 C.J.S. Appearances § 4 (1975). See Diaber v. Con/Chem, Inc.,
57 Ill.
App. 3d 918, 373 N.E.2d 805 (1978); CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 418-10(a)(1) (West
1973).

147. 436 U.S. at 88.
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the defendant to decide the support issue 148 because he did not purposefully benefit from any activity relating to California; he did not
have sufficient minimum contacts with that state to warrant the
court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over him. 149 "[T]he mere act
of sending a child to California to live with her mother is not a commercial act and connotes no intent to obtain or expectancy of receiving a corresponding benefit in the State that would make fair the
assertion of that State's judicial jurisdiction. ' 150 The Court, in
Kulko, made one of the basic requirements of due process and personal jurisdiction, i.e., minimum contacts between the forum state
and the nonresident defendant, applicable in the area of domestic
relations adjudication. 151
The interpretation of personal jurisdiction requiring the nonresident defendant to have minimum contacts with the forum and notice
and opportunity to be heard has important implications relating to
the validity of a custody decree issued consistent with the UCCJA.
The UCCJA provides that "reasonable notice and opportunity to be
heard shall be given to the contestants, any parent whose parental
rights have not been previously terminated, and any person who has
physical custody of the child."1 52 The UCCJA, however, does not
make any provision for actual personal jurisdiction over the nonresident contestant. 5 3 Jurisdiction under the UCCJA is based not on
148. Id. at 94.
149. Id. at 96. The Court also weighed several other factors in reaching its decision,
including the fact that the father's cause of action did not arise either from any physical
damages to any person or property in California caused by the father or from any interstate
commercial enterprise of the father. It arose from the father's personal domestic relations. Id.
at 96-97.
150. Id. at 101.
151. See, e.g., In re the Marriage of Hall, 25 Wash. App. 530, 607 P.2d 898 (1980).
152. UCCJA § 4; id. Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 130 (1979). The drafters of the
UCCJA also note that notice and opportunity to be heard is a prerequisite to the validity,
recognition, and enforcement of a custody decree issued under the UCCJA. See id. § 12 Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 149, 150 (1979). The UCCJA also requires that notice calculated
to give actual notice be given to nonresidents. UCCJA § 5. Notice, under the provisions of the
UCCJA, may be given by personal delivery of process outside the state, by return receipt mail,
by publication as directed by the court, or pursuant to the jurisdictional requirements of the
state in which service of process is to be made. Id. The PKPA also provides that notice and
opportunity to be heard be given to the litigants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(e) (Supp. IV 1980).
153. See UCCJA § 3; Bodenheimer, supra note 64, at 1231-35. See also UCCJA § 12
Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 150 (1979). In commenting on the binding effect of a custody
decree, the commissioners noted that "[there is no requirement for technical personal jurisdiction, on the traditional theory that custody determinations, as distinguished from support actions . . . are proceedings in rem or proceedings affecting status." Id. For a discussion of
custody proceedings as status determinations, see infra text accompanying notes 164-71. The
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the minimum contacts that the nonresident contestant may have
with the forum state, but rather on the maximum contacts that the
child has with the forum. 5 Because the UCCJA does not require a
court to obtain personal jurisdiction over a nonresident custody litigant before issuing a custody decree, the validity of such a decree is
questionable-the Supreme Court held in May v. Anderson that a
custody decree is not entitled to full faith and credit unless the issuing court had personal jurisdiction over the nonresident parent. 155 A
decree may also be invalid unless it first satisfies the due process
requirement of minimum contacts between the nonresident and the
15

forum.

Courts in different jurisdictions, however, have recognized and
enforced custody decrees issued in accordance with the UCCJA's jurisdictional standards, provided that the due process requirements of
notice and opportunity to be heard are satisfied, even if the court did
not first obtain personal jurisdiction over the nonresident litigant.157
58
In Perry v. Ponder,1
the Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that it
was not a violation of due process to adjudicate the custody of a
child who is a resident of the forum state where the nonresident parent does not have minimum contacts with the forum.' 9 The Perry
court first distinguished the situation found in Kulko'60 from a pure
custody proceeding. The litigation in Kulko involved a child support
order, which is considered similar to a claim for a debt imposing a
PKPA similarly does not provide for actual personal jurisdiction over the parties. See 28
U.S.C. § 1738A (Supp. IV 1980).
154. See UCCJA § 3; supra text accompanying notes 71-78.
155. 345 U.S. 528, 534 (1953). See supra text accompanying notes 37-41.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 151-52.
157. See Goldfarb v. Goldfarb, 246 Ga. 24, 268 S.E.2d 648 (1980)(Georgia Supreme
Court holding that due process is not violated where there is a sufficient nexus between the
court and the child so that the court is in a position to inform itself as to the best interests of
the child); Yearta v. Scroggins, 245 Ga. 831, 268 S.E.2d 151 (1980)(custody judgment rendered without personal jurisdiction over one parent will be recognized and enforced where the
nonresident litigant received notice of a custody proceeding by certified mail but failed to
respond); Perry v. Ponder, 604 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). See also Bodenheimer &
Neeley-Kvarme, JurisdictionOver Child Custody and Adoption After Shaffer and Kulko, 12
U.C.D. L. REv. 229 (1979).
158. 604 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). Perry is not a case involving the UCCJA.
Texas has not as yet enacted the UCCJA, but has adopted two statutes that are equivalent to
the UCCJA's provisions for jurisdiction and recognition of out-of-state custody decrees. The
Perrycourt recognized that even though Texas had not adopted the UCCJA, that fact did not
preclude Texas' adoption of the underlying principles of the UCCJA insofar as they were
consistent with Texas' case law. Id. at 317.
159. Id. at 313.
160. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
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personal judgment obligating the defendant to pay money to the
plaintiff. Insofar as a personal obligation is the subject of the litigation, a court cannot enter a binding decree unless the requirements
of due process, i.e., minimum contacts and notice and opportunity to
be heard, are met.1 16

The Perry court, however, concluded that custody is more like a
status determination,1 2 which can be litigated and enforced by the
state in which the child resides. Unlike an action for support, a custody determination would not require any affirmative action on the
part of the nonresident parent; the only consequence of a default on
the part of the nonresident custody litigant would be a reduction of
his rights under the custody decree rather than an increase of any
obligation that may be imposed upon him by the court.""'
The Supreme Court apparently has recognized an exception
from the strict requirements of personal jurisdiction and due process
for status determinations. In Pennoyer v. Neff,"" the Court raised
the possibility that status adjudications may be exempted from the
traditional notion of personal jurisdiction based on actual physical
presence of the nonresident defendant in the forum. The Pennoyer
Court clarified its holding by stating:
[W]e do not mean to assert, by any thing we have said, that a
State may not authorize proceedings to determine the status of one
of its citizens towards a non-resident, which would be binding
within the State, though made without service of process or personal notice to the non-resident. The jurisdiction which every State
possesses to determine the civil stdtus and capacities of all its inhabitants involves authority to prescribe the conditions on which
proceedings affecting them may be commenced and carried on
161. 604 S.W.2d at 312-13. In addition to an adjudication of the custody issue, Perry
involved an action for child support. Id. at 310-11. See supra text accompanying notes 141-51.
In Perry, the court sustained a lower court decision upholding the father's special appearance.
The court held that the father, an Alabama resident, lacked sufficient minimum contacts with
Texas to support the state's exercise of jurisdiction to impose a money judgment against him.
Id. at 312.
162. Status determinations include those matters about "which the forum state may
have such an interest that its courts may reasonably make an adjudication affecting that relationship, even though one of the parties to the relationship may have had no personal contacts
with the forum state." Id. at 314. A custody determination has traditionally been considered a
status determination. H. CLARK, supra note 50, § 11.5, at 319. Other status adjudications
include divorce and adoption proceedings. Bodenheimer & Neeley-Kvarme, supra note 157, at
240.
163. 604 S.W.2d at 313.
164. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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within its territory.18

5

A century later, in Shaffer v. Heitner,e6 the Court appeared to
have reaffirmed the exemption of status determinations from the requirements of due process and personal jurisdiction. In a footnote,
the Court stated that "[w]e do not suggest that jurisdictional doctrines other than those discussed in text, such as the particularized
rules governing adjudication
of status, are inconsistent with the
16 7
standard of fairness.
The Shaffer footnote sets forth a two pronged test for the exception to the minimum contact rule: First, there must be a status adjudication; second, there must be specialized rules for a court's exercise of jurisdiction in the matter. 168 The UCCJA appears to satisfy
both prongs of this test. First, the drafters of the UCCJA have retained the traditional notion that custody adjudications are status
determinations.16 9 Second, the UCCJA proposes specific bases upon
which a court can exercise jurisdiction: the home state test, the significant connection and substantial evidence test, and parens patriae
jurisdiction.170 Under the status exception, a court could issue a valid
and binding custody decree without fully satisfying the minimum
contacts requirement.171
Regardless of the compelling implications of these two instances
of Supreme Court dicta, the holding of May v. Anderson that custody decrees must be issued with personal jurisdiction over the nonresident litigant 72 is still a controlling factor in a court's decision to
recognize an out-of-state custody decree.I7 3 The court in Perry v.
Ponder, however, believed that the May decision was not applicable
where the custody decree had been issued by the state in which the
child and at least one parent resided.'7 4 The court proposed four rea165. Id. at 734 (emphasis in original).
166. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
167.

Id. at 208 n.30 (emphasis added). See also Bodenheimer & Neeley-Kvarme, supra

note 157, at 240 (status determination "based on specialized jurisdictional rules meet[s] due
process requirements of fairness without the need for minimal contacts").
168. Bodenheimer & Neeley-Kvarme, supra note 157, at 240.
169. UCCJA § 12 Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 150 (1979).
170. See UCCJA § 3.
171. See UCCJA § 4 Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 130 (1979); id. § 12 Comissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 150 (1979); id § 13 Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 151 (1979).

172. 345 U.S. 528, 533-34 (1953)(plurality opinion).
173. See generally Sherman, Child Custody Jurisdictionand the ParentalKidnapping
Prevention Act-A Due Process Dilemma?, 17 TuLSA L.J. 713 (1982).

174.

604 S.W.2d at 320-21. The rationale of the court in Perry, by implication, may be

applicable to the UCCJA since jurisdiction under the UCCJA is based on the child's home
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sons for this conclusion. First, since May involved a custody decree
issued by a court that had no actual contact with the children at the
time the decree was issued, 175 the Perry court suggested that May be
"limited to a situation in which the court that rendered the custody
decree had no physical access to the child.

'1 76

Second, the court in Perry noted that the May decision was not
a majority opinion but rather a plurality decision; 77 the position of
the justice "who concurred upon the narrowest ground" is considered
to be the fragmented Court's holding. 78 Thus, the Court's holding in
May would be limited to Justice Frankfurter's view. He opined that
the only issue the Court decided was that, although the full faith and
credit clause did not require Ohio to follow the prior Wisconsin decree, Ohio's decision to be so bound was not a violation of due process, notwithstanding that the Wisconsin decree had been issued
without personal jurisdiction over the nonresident mother.17
Third, the Perry court determined that the May opinion had to
be examined in light of the Court's later interpretation of due process and personal jurisdiction in Shaffer v. Heitner180 Finally, the
Perry court concluded that the May Court did not consider the children's best interests, the controlling factor in all child custody disputes today.18 ' The Perry court concluded that, in all probability, the
Supreme Court today would not apply the May holding to a custody
determination issued without personal jurisdiction over the nonresident litigant 8in2 a situation involving a child who is a resident of the
forum state.

A court's willingness to recognize and enforce a custody decree
obtained without the personal jurisdiction over the nonresident contestant may have several important implications. Where one parent
abducts the child before a custody decree has been issued, the nonstate or the presence of a significant connection between the child, the parent, and the forum,
and substantial evidence concerning the child's care and training present in the forum. See

UCCJA § 3.
175. 604 S.W.2d at 320. In May, the children and the mother were residents of Ohio
and not Wisconsin, the decree-issuing state. See 345 U.S. at 530.
176.
177.

604 S.W.2d at 320.
Id. In May, Justice Burton delivered the opinion for four justices; Justice Frank-

furter concurred; Justice Jackson, Justice Reed, and Justice Minton all dissented; Justice
Clark took no part in the decision. See 345 U.S. at 528, 535, 536, 542.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

604
345
604
604
Id.

S.W.2d
U.S. at
S.W.2d
S.W.2d

at 320 (citation omitted).
536 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
at 321. See supra text accompanying notes 166-68.
at 321.
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snatching parent would be able to obtain a custody decree pursuant
to the jurisdictional requirements of the UCCJA 183 without first obtaining personal jurisdiction over the abducting parent. This decree
would then be binding in any court in which the snatching parent
tries to litigate the custody issue;"" once again, the snatching parent
would have no court available in which to litigate custody. As long
as the decree has been issued in accordance with the jurisdictional
requirements of the UCCJA, 8 5 that decree would be recognized and
enforced in those states governed by the UCCJA 86 The drafters of
the UCCJA and the courts that are governed by this Act apparently
have heeded the prophetic warning
of Justice Jackson in his dissent87
ing opinion in May v. Anderson:
The Court's decision holds that the state in which a child and
one parent are domiciled and which is primarily concerned about
his welfare cannot constitutionally adjudicate controversies as to
his guardianship. The state's power here is defeated by the absence
of the other parent. .

.

. The convenience of a leave-taking parent

is placed above the welfare of the child, but neither party is greatly
aided in obtaining a decision. The Wisconsin courts cannot bind
the mother, and the Ohio courts cannot bind the father. A state of
the law such as this, where possession apparently is not merely
nine points of the law but all of them and self-help the ultimate
authority, has little to commend it in legal logic or as a principle
of order in a federal system. 188

The individual states, by enacting the UCCJA, are attempting
to remedy the defects in child custody determinations caused by the
judicial system. By refusing to exercise jurisdiction in those situa183. See UCCJA § 3.
184. See id. Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 123 (1979); id. § 13 Commissioners' Note,
9 U.L.A. 151-52. However, notice and opportunity to be heard must be given to the absent
parent. See supra note 152.
185. UCCJA § 3.
186. Id. § 13. See supra text accompanying notes 121-34.
187. 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 539 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Mr. Justice Jackson further
noted that:
Personal jurisdiction of all parties to be affected by a proceeding is highly desirable,
to make certain that they have had valid notice and opportunity to be heard. But
the assumption that it overrides all other considerations and in its absence a state is
constitutionally impotent to resolve questions of custody flies in the face of our own
cases.
Id. at 541 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Jackson was referring to those instances where
the state of domicile of one party can issue a valid divorce decree without obtaining personal
jurisdiction over the other party. Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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tions where a parent comes to court to litigate custody after that
parent has snatched the child, the courts are denying the snatching
parent a forum for the litigation of the custody issue. Whether the
reason for the denial of jurisdiction is the court's failure to meet the
jurisdictional standards of the UCCJA,189 the existence of another
court's continuing jurisdiction over an existing custody decree, 190 or
the unclean hands of the petitioner, 91 the doors of the courthouse
are closed to the abducting.parent.
III.

THE PARENTAL KIDNAPING PREVENTION ACT OF

1980

On December 28, 1980, President Carter signed into law the
Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA), 92 the first federal statute to address the problem of interstate parental abductions.19 3 During the previous decade, Congress had become aware
that child snatching was becoming a major problem. The lack of effective state'and federal criminal sanctions, and the Supreme Court's
determination that the full faith and credit clause does not apply to
custody decrees, were seen as the major causes of the problem.19 4
Although the UCCJA was enacted by individual states as an attempt to solve these problems, it was not-indeed, could not be-as
effective as a federal statute might be, since by definition a federal
statute would establish uniformity among the states.
Thus, in 1980, the PKPA was enacted to establish a federal uniform standard for a court's exercise of jurisdiction in custody matters and to determine the effect that a state court must give to the
custody decrees of sister states.1 95 The general purposes of the PKPA
are similar to those of the UCCJA: To promote cooperation among
courts deciding child custody matters so that a custody decision can
189. UCCJA § 3. See supra text accompanying notes 71-78.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 79-83.
191. UCCJA § 8. See supra text accompanying notes 99-104.
192. PKPA, Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3566, 3568 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A
(Supp. IV 1980); 42 U.S.C. § 663 (Supp. IV 1980); 18 U.S.C. § 1073 note (Supp. IV 1980)).
193. Earlier federal kidnaping statutes had exempted parental abductions from their
provisions. See Act of June 22, 1932, ch. 271, 47 Stat. 326 (the "Lindbergh Law" creating
federal criminal sanctions for only those abductions made for the purpose of obtaining "ransom or reward"); Act of May 18, 1934, ch. 301, 48 Stat. 781 (amending the "Lindbergh Law"
to include abductions made for any purpose, but inserting an explicit exemption from prosecution for parents who abduct their own children). That exemption remains in force today. See
18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
194. See 125 CONG. REC. 739 (1979).
195. PKPA, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 7(b), 94 Stat. 3566, 3569 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
1738A note (Supp. IV 1980)).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol11/iss3/7

28

Silverman: The Search for a Solution to Child Snatching

1983]

CHILD SNATCHING

be issued by the state best able to protect the child's welfare; to facilitate the enforcement and recognition of custody decrees in other
states; to discourage interstate custody disputes; to avoid conflicts
and competitions between courts deciding custody matters; and to
196
deter child snatching.
There are three separate provisions of the PKPA. First, a state
is required to extend full faith and credit to a custody decree issued
in another state if that decree was issued consistent with the jurisdictional requirements of the PKPA. 197 Second, the use of the Federal
Parent Locator Service is extended to enable specified authorities to
locate parents who have taken, restrained, or concealed their children.198 Third, the PKPA extends the application of the Fugitive
Felon Act199 to instances of child snatching, thereby enabling federal
officers to assist state agencies in locating and apprehending fugitives
200
from state justice.
A.

JurisdictionalRequirements of the PKPA

The PKPA provides that "[t]he appropriate authorities of every
State shall enforce according to its terms, and shall not modify except as provided . . . any child custody determination made consistently with the provisions of this section by a court of another
State."201 Thus, a custody decree issued in compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the PKPA will be given full faith and
credit in every court of the United States.
The PKPA proposes standards for a court's exercise of jurisdiction that are similar to those in the UCCJA. °2 These include jurisdiction based on the child's home state; a significant connection with
the forum and substantial evidence existing in the state concerning
196. Id. § 7(c), 94 Stat. 3566, 3569 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A note (Supp. IV
1980)).
197. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (Supp. IV 1980). See infra text accompanying notes 201-03.
198. 42 U.S.C. § 663 (Supp. IV 1980). The Federal Parent Locator Service was originally established to help certain authorized agencies and persons locate the whereabouts of
absent parents who had defaulted in their support obligations. 42 U.S.C. § 653 (1976). For the
regulations governing the use of the Federal Parent Locator Service in instances of child
snatching, see Requests to Use the Federal Parent Locator Service in Parental Kidnaping and
Child Custody Cases, 46 Fed. Reg. 54,554 (1981) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 302.35,
303.15, -.69, -.70).
199. 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1976).
200. PKPA, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 10, 94 Stat. 3566, 3573 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §
1073 note (Supp. IV 1980)). See infra text accompanying notes 236-67.
201. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 71-75; UCCJA § 3.
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the child's care and training; parens patriae jurisdiction; and the lack
of another forum in which to litigate custody because either another
state declined to exercise jurisdiction or because no other state could
meet any of the other enumerated jurisdictional bases. 203 The PKPA
also provides for a court's continuing jurisdiction over its own custody decrees.20 4
Although in essence, the PKPA adopted the jurisdictional requirements of the UCCJA, 0 5 several important differences remain.
First, the UCCJA is not a reciprocal law among the states; it can be
fully implemented and enforced by each individual state that enacts
2

it,

06

but its policies and procedures are only binding among those

states that have enacted it. The PKPA, however, as a federal statute,
must be enforced in all states. It preempts any state statutory provi20 7
sion that conflicts with any of its provisions.

Second, the UCCJA requires a state to -recognize and enforce
another state's custody decree only if the "issuing state had either
adopted the Act or issued the decree according to its provisions. Custody decrees of non-UCCJA states would be entitled to recognition
and enforcement in a UCCJA-state only if they had been issued
under standards similar to those incorporated in the UCCJA 08
Recognition and enforcement is accorded to another state's custody
decree as a matter of comity under state law.209 The PKPA mandates that full faith and credit be awarded to all custody decrees
issued in accordance with the jurisdictional requirements of the
203.

28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).

204. Id. § 1738A(d).
205.

Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c) (Supp. IV 1980) (jurisdictional requirements of

the PKPA) with UCCJA § 3 (jurisdictional requirement of the UCCJA).
206. See Commissioners' Prefatory Note, supra note 46, at 114.
207. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2: "This Constitution, and .the laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof;. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding." See Mitchell v. Mitchell, No. Civ. 3084 (Ala. Civ.
App. June 9, 1982)(available on LEXIS, State library, Omni file); Flannery v. Stephenson,
416 So. 2d 1034 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982); State ex rel. Valles v. Brown, 97 N.M. 327, 639 P.2d
1181 (1981); In re Mebert v. Mebert, I11 Misc. 2d 500, 444 N.Y.S.2d 834 (Fain. Ct. 1981);
In re Leslie L.F. v. Constance F., 110 Misc. 2d 86, 441 N.Y.S.2d 911 (Fain. Ct. 1981).
208. UCCJA § 13; see supra text accompanying notes 123-24.
209. See generally S. KATZ, supra note 18, at 55-82. The UCCJA, however, does not
preclude a state from awarding full faith and credit to another state's custody decree, if it is a
policy of the state to do so. UCCJA § 13 Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 151 (1979). See
Shermer v. Cornelius, 278 S.E.2d 349 (W. Va. 1981) (West Virginia court awarded full faith
and credit to a New York custody decree).
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Act.210
Third, although home state jurisdiction is preferable under the
UCCJA, a court could exercise jurisdiction if the forum meets any
of the other enumerated bases of jurisdiction, 1 such as, significant
connection and substantial evidence, parens patriae, or lack of another forum that can exercise jurisdiction consistent with the
UCCJA 1 The PKPA grants almost exclusive continuing jurisdiction to the child's home state for the determination of child custody
matters. 1 8 Although other bases for a court's jurisdiction are provided in the PKPA, they are of only secondary importance. In Virginia E.E. v. Alberto S.P.,214 the court interpreted the addition of
the words "it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction
under subparagraph (A) [the home state test]" 215 in the introductory
sentence to the significant connection and substantial evidence test 2 6
as a federal mandate that home state jurisdiction has priority over
all the other bases of jurisdiction provided in the PKPA.217 The
PKPA is procedurally more rigid than the UCCJA, allowing the
court less discretion in its determination of whether it can exercise
jurisdiction.2 18 By providing even stricter standards for a court's jurisdiction, the PKPA makes it more difficult for the abducting parent
to find a forum in which custody can be litigated.
Fourth, the UCCJA codified the clean hands doctrine requiring
210. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (Supp. IV 1980). See Pierce v. Pierce, 640 P.2d 899 (Mont.
1982) (a custody decree issued under the UCCJA's standards is entitled to full faith and
credit under the requirements of the PKPA); Virginia E.E. v. Alberto S.P., 110 Misc. 2d 448,
440 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Far. Ct. 1981) (New York is not required to extend full faith and credit
to a California custody decree where California failed to meet the jurisdictional requirements
of the PKPA).
211. See Virginia E.E.v. Alberto S.P., 110 Misc. 2d 448, 440 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Far. Ct.
1981).
212. UCCJA § 3.
213. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d) (Supp. IV 1980). See Virginia E.E. v. Alberto S.P., 110
Misc. 2d 448, 440 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Fam.Ct. 1981); William R.B v. Cynthia B, 108 Misc. 2d
920, 439 N.Y.S.2d 265 (Fam. Ct. 1981).
214. 110 Misc. 2d 448, 440 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Fam.Ct. 1981).
215. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 1980); see supra text accompanying note
203.
216. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(B)(ii).
217. See 110 Misc. 2d at 455, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 983-84. A further factor that suggests
the conclusion that home state jurisdiction is exclusive and has priority over all other bases of
jurisdiction is the absence of the word "or" between the various subparagraphs of the PKPA's
jurisdiction provision. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1980). Compare 28 U.S.C. §
1738A(c)(2) with UCCJA § 3.
218. Mitchell v. Mitchell, No. Civ. 3084 (Ala. Civ. App. June 9, 1982) (available on
LEXIS, State library, Omni file).
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a court to decline jurisdiction in a case of child snatching, as long as
the child's best interests would not be harmed.2 19 Although one of
the express purposes of the PKPA is to "deter interstate abductions
and other unilateral removals of children undertaken to obtain custody and visitation awards, 220 the statute falls short of absolutely
denying jurisdiction in instances of child snatching. Since the federal
statute does not contain a clean hands provision, the court may look
to the UCCJA to determine whether it should decline jurisdiction in
instances of child snatching.221
B. Modification of a Custody Decree Under the PKPA
The PKPA precludes a court in one state from modifying the
custody decrees of other states unless certain conditions are met.22
The PKPA provides:
A court of a State may modify a determination of the custody
of the same child made by a court of another State, if(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child custody determination; and
(2) the court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction, or it
has declined 223to exercise such jurisdiction to modify such
determination.
In In re Leslie L.F. v. Constance F.,224 the family court in New York
developed a scheme by which a court could determine whether it had
jurisdiction under the PKPA to modify the custody decree of another
state. 225 The first step involves determining whether the original decree is entitled to full faith and credit under the PKPA. If the custody decree had been issued in compliance with the requirements of
the PKPA, it would be entitled to full faith and credit.226
219. UCCJA § 8; see supra text accompanying notes 99-104.
220. PKPA, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 7(c)(6), 94 Stat. 3566, 3569 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
1738A note (Supp. IV 1980)).
221. Flannery v. Stephenson, 416 So. 2d 1034, 1038-39 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982). See 28
U.S.C. § 1738A (Supp. IV 1980).
222. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
223. Id. § 1738A(f).
224. 110 Misc. 2d 86, 441 N.Y.S.2d 911 (Fain. Ct. 1981). This case involved a petition
to modify a California custody decree.
225. New Mexico has also proposed an analytical process similar to the one proposed in
New York. See Belosky v. Belosky, 97 N.M. 365, 640 P.2d 471 (1982); State ex rel. Valles v.
Brown, 97 N.M. 327, 639 P.2d 1181 (1981).
226. 110 Misc. 2d at 88, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 914. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (Supp. IV
1980). In Leslie L.F., New York determined that California satisfied the jurisdictional requirements of the PKPA to render an initial custody decree. California had been the child's home
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The second step involves the determination of whether the court
has jurisdiction to modify that decree.227 The court must determine
whether it can exercise jurisdiction under its own state law and
whether the decree-issuing state can no longer exercise continuing
jurisdiction over its own decree. 8 Under the PKPA, a court's jurisdiction over its own custody decree continues as long as "the requirement [that such court has jurisdiction under the law of such State]
continues to be met and such State remains the residence of the
child or of any contestant."' The court, therefore, must look to the
state law of the decree-issuing forum to determine whether that state
still retains jurisdiction over its own custody decree. 3
The third step involves an inquiry into whether the forum state
A
has jurisdiction to modify the decree under its own state law. 23 1 232
state must first examine the UCCJA's provision for modification
to determine whether the decree was originally issued under factual
circumstances that would satisfy the Act's jurisdictional standards.
If these standards are met, the decree would be entitled to recognition. 33 Under the UCCJA, a court can modify a custody decree if
the decree-issuing state cannot exercise "jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accordance with [the
UCCJAJ. '' It. is important to note that it is the second court and
state for more than six months prior to the commencement of the custody action and was the
child's home state at the time of the initial proceeding. 110 Misc. 2d at 89, 441 N.Y.S.2d at
914. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1980).
227. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f) (Supp. IV 1980); see supra text accompanying note 219.
228. 110 Misc. 2d at 89, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 914-15.
229. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d) (Supp. IV 1980). A court only has continuing jurisdiction
over a custody decree issued consistently with the requirements of the PKPA. Id.
230. 110 Misc. 2d at 89, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 915. See also Flannery v. Stephenson, 416 So.
2d 1034, 1038 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982) (Alabama can properly exercise continuing jurisdiction
over its own decree where it was issued in compliance with the PKPA and one parent remains
a resident of the state. This jurisdiction was not affected by the determination of a court in
Michigan where that decree was not issued in compliance with the PKPA.) William R.B v.
Cynthia B, 108 Misc. 2d 920, 439 N.Y.S.2d 265 (Fam. Ct. 1981) (New York will defer its
jurisdiction to a Connecticut court which has continued to exercise jurisdiction over the decree.) In Leslie L.F., New York determined that California, under its own version of the
UCCJA, did not satisfy any of the jurisdictional prerequisites. 110 Misc. 2d at 89-90, 441
N.Y.S.2d at 915. California could not exercise continuing jurisdiction over its own custody
decree pursuant to the PKPA and New York could exercise jurisdiction to modify the decree.
Id. at 92, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 916. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f).
231. 110 Misc. 2d at 92, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
232. UCCJA § 14; see supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
233. 110 Misc. 2d at 95, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 918.
234. UCCJA § 14(a). In Leslie L.F., New York concluded that California could not
meet the UCCJA's standards for continuing jurisdiction. 110 Misc. 2d at 95-98, 441 N.Y.S.2d
at 918-19.
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not the decree-issuing court that determines whether the original fo235
rum still possesses continuing jurisdiction over the custody decree.
By providing for the exclusive continuing jurisdiction of the decree-issuing court, the PKPA makes it more difficult for an abducting parent to find a forum in which the custody issue can be litigated. By narrowing the number of appropriate forums where a
parent can litigate the custody issue, the PKPA may eventually eliminate interstate custody disputes between parents. Child snatching
may be effectively deterred through the stricter modification standards of the PKPA. If a court cannot entertain a petition for the
modification of a custody decree of another state, the abducting parent will be forced to return to the original decree-issuing forum for
any custody modification proceedings.
C.

The Fugitive Felon Act and Child Snatching

The PKPA extends the application of the Fugitive Felon Act2e
to cases of "parental kidnaping and interstate or international flight
to avoid prosecution under applicable State felony statutes."2 8 ' The
Fugitive Felon Act provides that:
Whoever moves or travels in interstate or foreign commerce
with intent . ..to avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement

after conviction, under the laws of the place from which he flees,
for a crime, or an attempt to commit a crime, punishable by death
or which is a felony under the laws of the place from which the
fugitive flees, . . . shall be fined not more
than $5,000 or impris238
oned not more than five years, or both.

The Fugitive Felon Act empowers the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to aid state law enforcement officers in the search for and
the apprehension of fugitives from state justice.239 Before a fugitive
felon warrant is issued for a snatching parent, the state must demonstrate to the federal authorities that it is willing to extradite and
prosecute the abducting parent as a felon under the applicable state
child snatching statute 4 0 Once the fugitive felon is apprehended,
235.

110 Misc. 2d at 96, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 918.

236. 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
237. PKPA, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 10, 94 Stat. 3566, 3573 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §
1073 note (Supp. IV 1980)).
238. 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1976)(emphasis added).
239. Beach v. Smith, 535 F. Supp. 560, 562 (S.D. Cal. 1982); See 126 CONG. REC.
SI5,945 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1980) (statement of Sen. Wallop).
240. JusticeDep't Scored For Flouting Parental Kidnapping Act's Mandate, 7 FAM. L.
REP, (BNA) 2739, 2741 (Oct. 6, 1981); 126 CONG. REc. S15,945 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1980).
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the FBI does not participate in the felon's extradition to the state
from which he fled. 41 Instead, the federal charges usually are
dropped and the felon is turned over to the local state authorities to
await extradition and prosecution by the state requesting the fugitive
felon warrant.2 42 The application of the Fugitive Felon Act and the
involvement of the FBI in instances of child snatching are dependent
on a state's classification of child snatching as .a felony.243
241. Justice Dept Scored For FloutingParentalKidnapping Act's Mandate, 7 FAM. L.
REP. (BNA) 2739, 2741 (Oct. 6, 1981). The Fugitive Felon Act is not a substitute for a state's
extradition warrant for a fugitive felon. The FBI would only extradite the fugitive felon if he
was to be subjected to a federal prosecution. Id.
242. Id.; Beach, 535 F. Supp. at 563; 126 CONG. REC. S15,945 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1980).
243. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1073, 1073 note (Supp. IV 1980); see supra text accompanying notes
227-37.
The Fugitive Felon Act would be applicable in the following states that classify child
stealing, child snatching, custodial interference, or parental kidnaping (abduction) as a felony:
ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.320 (1978)(felony if the child is removed from the state); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13.1302 (1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2411 (1977)(felony if the child is removed from the state); CAL. PENAL CODE § 278.5 (West Supp. 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. §
18-3-304 (1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 785 (Supp. 1982)(felony if the child is removed
from the state); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 787.04 (West Supp. 1982)(felony if the child is removed
contrary to a valid court order); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1312 (Supp. 1982)(interstate interference with custody is a felony if the child is either removed from the state or taken from
another state and brought into Georgia); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 707-726 (Supp. 1981)(felony
if the child is removed from the state); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-4501 to -4503 (1979); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, § 10-5 (Smith-Hurd 1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-3.3 (West 1979)(felony if
the child is removed from the state); IowA CODE ANN. § 710.6 (West 1979)(felony if the
child is removed from the state in violation of a custody order); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3422a
(1981) (aggravated interference with custody is a felony); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:45 (West
Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 303 (Supp. 1982); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §
2A (Supp. 1982)(felony if the child is removed from the state); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
265, § 26A (West Supp. 1982)(felony if the child is exposed to danger); MICH. CoMp. LAWS
ANN. § 750.350 (Supp. 1982)(felony only if the child had been adopted and is taken by the
natural parent); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.26 (West Supp. 1982)(felony only if the child is not
returned within fourteen days); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-53 (Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
565.15b (Vernon 1979)(felony if the child is removed from the state in violation of a custody
order); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-304 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-316 (1979)(felony if the
child is taken in violation of a valid custody decree); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.359 (1979)(felony if the child is taken in violation of a custody order); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 633
(1973)(kidnaping is a felony); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-4-4 (1978)(felony if the child is removed from the state); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.50 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-320.1 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14-22.1 (1981)(felony if the child is removed
from the state; incorporated into the UCCJA); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.04 (Page
1982)(felony if the child is removed from the state); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1627 (West
Supp. 1981)(incorporated into the UCCJA); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.245, -.257 (1981); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 11-26-1.1 (1981)(felony if the child is removed from the state in violation of an
existing custody decree); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-495 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-19-10 (Supp. 1982)(felony if the child is removed from the state);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-303 (1982); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.03 (Vernon Supp. 1982);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-303 (Supp. 1981)(felony if the child is removed from the state); VT.
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Although the application of the Fugitive Felon Act to instances
of child snatching would seem to provide an added deterrent to child
snatching, this deterrence may be more apparent than real, especially in view of the court's holding in Beach v. Smith. 44 In Beach,
the federal district court in California had to decide whether the custodial parent of a snatched child had standing 245 to challenge the
Justice Department's refusal to issue a warrant under the Fugitive
Felon Act, as extended by the PKPA, for the arrest of the mother
and maternal grandfather who had snatched the child from the paternal grandparents' home in California and fled to Texas. 248 After
charging them with felony child stealing, California issued arrest
and extradition warrants.24 On two separate occasions, the district
attorney requested that fugitive felon warrants be issued for the
child snatchers; the Justice Department, however, denied the
requests.248
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2451 (Supp. 1981); VA. CODE § 18.2-47 (Cum. Supp. 1981)(felony if
the child is removed from the state by a parent and the removal is punishable as contempt of
court in any proceeding that may be pending); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 946.71, -.715 (West
1982)(felony if the child is removed from the state; interference by a parent with the parental
rights of the other parent is a felony); Wyo. STAT. § 6-4-203 (Supp. 1982)(felony if the child
is concealed and the whereabouts of the child are not revealed to the custodial parent).
The Fugitive Felon Act would probably not apply in the following states that classify
child stealing, child snatching, custodial interference, or parental kidnaping (abduction) as
either a misdemeanor, a lesser offense, or no offense at all: ALA. CODE § 13A-6-45 (1982)
(relatives are exempted from the offense of interference with custody); CONN. GEN. STAT. §
53a-98 (Supp. 1982)(custodial interference is a misdemeanor where a relative takes the child;
but § 53a-97 provides that it is a felony if the child is exposed to danger or taken out of the
state); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2101 (1981) (kidnaping is a felony, but parents are exempted);
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 509.070 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982) (custodial interference is a felony, but relatives are exempted); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-4 (West Supp. 1982) (interference
with custody is a disorderly persons offense); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2904 (Purdon 1973);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.40.050 (1975); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-14 (1977)(Kidnaping or
concealing a child is a felony, but parents are exempted).
244. 535 F. Supp. 560 (S.D. Cal. 1982).
245. Standing involves the question "of whether 'a party has a sufficient stake in an
otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy.'" L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-17 at 79 (1978)(footnote omitted).
246. 535 F. Supp. at 562. They were not apprehended in Texas and subsequently fled to
New Mexico. At the time of the father's suit, their whereabouts were unknown. Id.
247. Id. In addition to felony child stealing, they were also charged with felony burglary
and battery because, during the snatching, the maternal grandfather struck and threatened the
paternal grandmother.
248. The district attorney's first request for a warrant was denied because the requirement that there be a showing by "independent and credible information that the child is in a
condition of abuse or neglect" before a warrant is issued for a snatching parent was not met.
Id. Even after the father obtained a psychologist's report stating that the child suffered "psychological injury" from the abduction, the Justice Department still refused to issue the war-
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The district court questioned the father's standing to contest the
Justice Department's denial of the warrants. To have standing, the
father had to establish that a connection existed between the injury
that he suffered and the department's refusal to issue the warrants.249 Since the court characterized the father's injury as "the violation of his legal right to custody of [the child] as established by [a
custody decree],"25 ° it decided that there was no connection between
the father's injury and the remedy sought. 51
The court concluded that even if the fugitive warrant had been
issued, the father's injury probably would not have been remedied;
were a federal warrant issued, the child could only be returned to the
custodial parent by indirect means. The warrant is issued, not for the
child, but only for the arrest of the snatching parent and any accomplices that parent may have.252 Once the fugitive parent is located
and arrested, the FBI agents are neither required not authorized to
search for the child; nor are they required to place the located child
in the custody of the proper local authorities or the custodial parent.25 The court in Beach concluded that "the effect of the issuance
of the warrant for [the mother and grandfather]
upon the return of
'2
[the child] to her father is wholly speculative. 54
The extension of the Fugitive Felon Act to instances of child
rant. Id.
The requirement that there must be evidence that the child might be abused or mistreated
by the abducting parent before a fugitive felon warrant is issued is being eliminated by the
Justice Department in 1983. U.S. OKs CUSTODY WARRANTS, Newsday, January 2, 1983, at
19, col. 3.
249. 535 F. Supp. at 563.
250. Id. The court rejected the father's characterization of the injury that he suffered.
The father claimed that his injury was "the denial of a federal remedy established by the
[PKPA]." Id. at 562. The court opined that this characterization would seem to indicate that
the father himself would be entitled to seek a federal warrant. Id. The right to obtain a warrant under the Fugitive Felon Act is reserved to state law enforcement authorities. Although
the PKPA extended the Fugitive Felon Act to include child snatching, the court could not find
any indication of congressional intent to change the requirements and allow an individual to
obtain a federal warrant. Id. The court concluded that because the father was just a member
of the class of persons who would be protected by the statute, "the refusal, to issue a warrant,
does not result in an injury separate from the injury caused by the underlying criminal act."
Id.
251. Id. at 563.
252. Id.
253. Id. The court further noted that even if the child is placed in the custody of the
local authorities of the state where the child is found, that state is not obligated, under the
PKPA, to recognize and enforce the prior custody decree unless it had been issued in accordance with the PKPA's jurisdictional standards. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 195210.
254. 535 F. Supp. at 563-64.
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snatching was added to the PKPA as a compromise proposal.2 55 Its
effectiveness as a deterrent to child snatching, however, falls short of
the effectiveness of the proposal it replaced. When the PKPA was
first introduced in the Senate in 1978, the bill contained a proposal
that would have made "restraint of a minor by a parent" a federal
misdemeanor and would have permitted the FBI to investigate child
snatchings sixty days after the local law enforcement authorities and
the parent locator service were notified. 26 The PKPA, however, was
not passed by Congress in that session. It was again introduced in
the Senate in 1979, this time containing a provision that would have
made it a federal misdemeanor for a parent, relative, or other specified person to take the child in violation of a custody decree issued in
accordance with the PKPA's jurisdictional requirements and transport that child across state lines.257 The bill created two separate
offenses: restraining a child "without good cause for more than thirty
days," punishable by a fine of $10,000, or imprisonment of not more
than thirty days, or both; and concealing a child and holding "him
in a place where he is not likely to be found for more than seven
days," punishable by a fine of $10,000, or imprisonment of not more
than six months, or both.258 The FBI would be able to investigate the
child snatching sixty days after the local law enforcement authorities
had been notified by the person who is entitled to legal custody of
the child and the assistance of the state parent locator service had
been requested. 259 This provision might have effectively eliminated
the parental exemption from the federal kidnaping statute. Although
the PKPA passed in the Congress, the criminalization provision of
the bill was eliminated and a compromise proposal extending the Fugitive Felon Act to instances of child snatching was substituted and
enacted.26o
255. See 126 CONG. REC. S15,944-45 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1980)(statement of Sen.
DeConcini).
256. See S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 499-500 (1978).
257. S. 105, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 739, 741 (1979). Persons who could
be convicted under this provision include: "[R]elatives by blood or marriage, guardians, foster
parents, and agents of such persons." Id. at 741.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See 126 CONG. REc. S15,943 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1980). Although the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980 is the "official" title of Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3566, the
PKPA was attached as a rider to a bill "to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to
provide for medicare coverage of pneumococcal vaccine and its administration." See PKPA,
Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3566. There are eleven sections to Pub. L. No. 96-611; only
sections 6-10 contain the provisions of the PKPA. Id.
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Perhaps Congress should reconsider the exclusion of criminal
sanctions against the snatching parent in the PKPA. Although the
Fugitive Felon Act was extended to include child snatching, the actual deterrent effect of the statute is questionable. By its own terms,
the statute is applicable only in those states that classify child
snatching as a felony.261 In order to deter child snatching more effectively, a strong uniform law on the federal level to criminalize child
snatching and eliminate the parental exemption from the federal kidnaping statute is needed. Child snatching might be further deterred
if every state amended its child snatching statute to impose stricter
penalties against a parent who snatches his own child. Although
many states classify child snatching as a felony, 26 2 several states restrict the felony designation only to those instances where the child
either is taken out of the state,26 a exposed to danger, or taken in
violation of a valid custody decree.265 Georgia has created the felony
of "interstate interference with custody ' 26 6 imposing sanctions not
only against those parents who snatch their children in Georgia and
take them out of that state, but also against those parents who
snatch their children from any other state and bring them into Georgia to conceal them from the custodial parent. 2 7 Perhaps if every
state enacted statutes similar to Georgia's child snatching provision,
child snatching might be effectively eliminated.
261. Except in New Jersey where a high misdemeanor is sufficient to invoke the Fugitive
Felon Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1976); For those states that classify child snatching as a felony,
see supra note 243. For those states that classify child snatching as a misdemeanor or a lesser
offense, see supra note 243.
262. See supra note 243.
263. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2411 (1977); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 707-726
(Supp. 1981). For other states that require that the child be removed from the state before

felony sanctions will be imposed, see supra note 243.
264. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 26A (West Supp. 1982).
265. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 787.04 (Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT.

§ 565.150
(Vernon 1979). For other states that impose felony sanctions when the child is taken in violation of a custody order, see supra note 243.
266. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1312 (Supp. 1982).

267. Id. Although states have statutes that impose criminal sanctions for child snatching, conviction and the imposition of fines and imprisonment are rare. See, e.g., People v.
Hyatt, 18 Cal. App. 3d 618, 96 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1971)(the snatching father was found guilty of

child stealing by a jury and was granted probation; as part of the probation, the father was
required to pay the mother the reasonable expenses she incurred in attempts to regain custody

of the children); State v. McCormick, 273 N.W.2d 624 (Minn. 1978)(the Supreme Court of
Minnesota found that the statute making it a felony to detain one's own child outside the state
was unconstitutional because it involved an illegitimate extension of the state's territorial
power). For a further discussion of criminal sanctions in child snatching, see S. KATZ, supra
note 18, at 89-98.
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AND THE

UCCJA

Both the PKPA and the UCCJA will provide some deterrence
to child snatching by precluding a parent who snatches his child
from litigating custody in a second forum.216 The application of both
statutes, however, is limited. Because both are jurisdictional statutes,
the implementation of the Acts' provisions is dependent upon the
noncustodial snatching parent's attempt to institute custody proceedings in a new and different forum. In most instances, both statutes
would require the court of the second forum to decline jurisdiction in
the matter and defer its jurisdiction to the court that first issued the
custody decree.269 Neither statute, however, would have any deterrent effect on parents who snatch their children and who do not attempt to relitigate the custody issue in a second forum.
Although both the UCCJA and the PKPA are operable in instances of child snatching, their application in custody disputes is not
strictly limited to instances of parental abduction of the child. Both
statutes are applicable in any interstate child custody proceeding. 270
In E.E.B. v. D.A.,2 1 a case that did not involve child abduction, 72
the New Jersey Supreme Court applied both the PKPA and the
UCCJA to an interstate custody dispute between the adoptive parents of a child and the natural mother who wanted the return of the
child. 17 The New Jersey court found that, although one of the major
purposes of the PKPA, as suggested by its title, is to deter interstate
parental kidnaping in custody disputes, the statute applies to any interstate dispute between persons seeking custody of a child.27 4
Perhaps the applicability of both statutes to all interstate custody disputes accounts for the lack of sanctions against the snatching
268. See supra text accompanying notes 71-105, 120-34, 201-21.
269. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a), (d), (f), (g) (Supp. IV 1980); UCCJA §§ 6, 7, 8,
13, 14.
270. E.E.B. v. D.A., 89 N.J. 595, 446 A.2d 872 (1982); In re Diane W. v. Norman W.,
112 Misc. 2d 114, 446 N.Y.S.2d 174 (Fam. Ct. 1982).
271. 89 N.J. 595, 446 A.2d 872 (1982).
272. An unwed mother gave her child up for adoption. One week after she signed the
surrender form for the Welfare Department in Ohio, she orally revoked her consent for the
adoption of the child. Id. at 599, 446 A.2d at 873. The natural mother later petitioned the
Ohio court for a writ of habeas corpus, but the writ was denied. Id. While the mother's appeal
was pending, the adoptive parents and the child moved to New Jersey because of the adoptive
father's work. Id. at 599-600, 446 A.2d at 874. The adoptive parents did not leave Ohio "to
evade an Ohio court order." Id. at 602, 446 A.2d at 875.
273. 89 N.J. at 598-602, 446 A.2d at 873-75.
274. Id. at 604, 446 A.2d at 876. See PKPA, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 7, 94 Stat. 3566,
3568-69 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A note (Supp. IV 1980)).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol11/iss3/7

40

Silverman: The Search for a Solution to Child Snatching

1983]

CHILD SNATCHING

parent in either statute. Both the UCCJA and the PKPA only provide that a snatching parent will be denied a forum in which to litigate the custody issue. 5 If child snatching is to be deterred, it may
become necessary to impose some type of penalty against the abducting parent. Although the imposition of criminal penalties against the
abducting parent might prove to be the best deterrent to child
snatching, the imposition of civil sanctions, such as fines that would
increase with the length of time that the noncustodial parent retained the child may also aid in deterring a parent from snatching
his own child.27 6
V.

COMMON LAW TORTS AS DETERRENTS TO CHILD SNATCHING

The UCCJA and the PKPA are statutory schemes whose primary purpose is to preclude a court's exercise of jurisdiction to modify or issue custody decrees in instances of child snatching. Although
both statutes do make some provisions for the recovery of travel ex-

penses, attorney's fees, and other litigation-related expenses, 1 the
custodial parent's primary means of recovering damages has been
through the application of several common law tort actions to child.
snatching. Courts have recognized that child snatching may lead to
recovery of damages for the intentional infliction of emotional
harm,2 78 civil conspiracy, 279 and even malpractice and negligence actions by the custodial parent against the abducting parent's attorney.2 80 Additionally, the abducted child is entitled to recover dam275. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (Supp. IV 1980); UCCJA §§ 8, 13, 14. North Dakota and
Oklahoma, however, have incorporated provisions for felony child snatching into their state's
version of the UCCJA. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14-22.1 (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §

1627 (West Supp. 1981). Although the PKPA extends the Fugitive Felon Act to instances of
child snatching, its effectiveness as a deterrent to child snatching is doubtful. See supra text
accompanying notes 236-67.
276. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Loeffler, 539 F. Supp. 998, 1005 (E.D. Wis.), affd, 694 F.2d
489 (7th Cir. 1982) (the court imposed a punitive damage award of $25,000 against a snatching mother that was to be increased at the rate of $2,000 per month until the child was returned to the custodial father).
277. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A note (Supp. IV 1980); UCCJA §§ 7(g), 8(c), 11(c), 15(b),
19, 20(c).
278. See Fenslage v. Dawkins, 629 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1980); Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F.
Supp. 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). See generally, Casenotes, Abduction of Child by Noncustodial
Parent:Damages for Custodial Parent'sMental Distress, 46 Mo. L. REv. 829 (1981).
279. See Fenslage v. Dawkins, 629 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1980); Lloyd v..Loeffier, 539 F.
Supp. 998 (E.D. Wis.), affd, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982). "[A] civil conspiracy is a 'combination of two or more persons by some concerted action to accomplish some unlawful purpose
or to accomplish by unlawful means some purpose not in itself unlawful.'" Lloyd, 539 F.
Supp. at 1003 (citations omitted).
280. See McEvoy v. Helikson, 277 Or. 781, 562 P.2d 540 (1977)(The court found that
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ages for false imprisonment from the abducting parent.28 '
Although bringing a tort action against the abducting parent
will not guarantee the child's return to the custodial parent, it will
reimburse the custodial parent for expenses incurred in attempts to
regain custody of the child.28 2 Because these actions are brought in
tort, courts have allowed the custodial parent to recover not only
compensatory damages to indemnify the parent for actual costs expended, but also have awarded large punitive damages awards. In
Fenslage v. Dawkins,8 3 the custodial mother was awarded $65,000
in compensatory damages for the abduction of the child, and an additional aggregate amount of $65,000 was assessed against the five
defendants who participated in the child snatching.284 In Kajtazi v.
Kajtazi,8 5 the custodial mother was awarded $14,950 for the loss of
services of the child and for her wounded feelings, $5,000 in legal
fees, and $100,000 as a punitive damage award for "the intentional
and malicious act of abducting the infant.' ' 26 The abducted child
was entitled to recover damages for false imprisonment against the
abducting father. The court awarded the child $5,980 for the actual
time of his false imprisonment (calculated at the rate of $20 per day
for each day the child was held), $5,000 for the actual false imprisonment, and $50,000 in punitive damages2 87for "the intentional and
malicious act of falsely imprisoning" him.
By recognizing that tort actions are available to the custodial
parent in instances of child snatching, the courts are willing to compensate the custodial parent for the injuries suffered, both monetary
and emotional, as a result of the snatching incident. By awarding
compensatory damages, courts are reimbursing the custodial parent
for the amounts expended in attempts to locate the child and regain
the custodial father had a cause of action against the abducting parent's attorney for negligently performing duties imposed on him pursuant to a stipulation between the parents that
was incorporated into a court order. The attorney was required to hold the noncustodial
mother's passport while she had temporary custody of the child. The mother was a Swiss
citizen. The attorney, however, gave the mother the passport while she still had the child and
she took the child to Switzerland.)
281. See Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15, 18 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
282. S.KATZ, supra note 18, at 101.
283. 629 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1980).
284, Id. at 1109. The punitive damage award was assessed against each defendant as
follows: $25,000 against the fither; $15,000 against his parents; $15,000 against his sister; and
$10,000 against his brother. Id.
285. 488 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
286. Id. at 21-22.
287. Id. at 21.
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custody. By imposing punitive damage awards, the courts, in effect,
are punishing the snatching parent for his actions.
Courts have also recognized that the very act of snatching the
child is itself the actionable tort of unlawful interference with the
custody of a person entitled to such custody.288 The Restatement
(Second) of Torts289 recognized that it is a tort to cause a minor
child to leave or not return home: "One who, with knowledge that
the parent does not consent, abducts or otherwise compels or induces
a minor child to leave a parent legally entitled to its custody or not
to return to the parent after it has been left him, is subject to liability to the parent. ' 290 According to the Restatement (Second), if both
parents are entitled to custody of the child and one parent snatches
the child, the other parent cannot maintain an action against the
abducting parent. If, however, one parent had been awarded sole
custody of the child, that parent could maintain a cause of action
against the noncustodial parent who snatches the child. 29 1 The Restatement (Second) would permit the custodial parent to recover
damages for the loss of society of the child, the emotional distress
the parent suffers from the child's abduction, and the reasonable expenses incurred in attempts to regain custody. 92
In Lloyd v. Loeffler,293 a case involving the abduction of a child
by her mother, the federal district court decided that, although Wisconsin had not as yet recognized the tort of unlawful interference
with custody of a parent entitled to such custody, the Wisconsin Supreme Court would recognize the existence of this tort, and awarded
the father damages for the child snatching. 294 The court based this
decision on three separate factors: First, the court decided that Wisconsin would follow the principles outlined in the Restatement (Second) which recognize as a tort all actions that cause a minor child to
leave or not return home.29 5 Second, interference with a parent's cus288. See Lloyd y. Loeffler, 539 F. Supp. 998 (E.D. Wis.), afl'd, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir.
1982); Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
289. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 (1977).
290. Id.
291. Id. comment c.
292.

Id. comment g. The Restatement (Second) would also allow the parent to recover

for any expenses "incurred or likely to be incurred in treating or caring for the child if it has
suffered illness or other bodily harm as a result of the defendant's tortious conduct." Id.
293.

539 F. Supp. 998 (E.D. Wis.), affd, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982).

294. 539 F. Supp at 1004. The district court made a similar conclusion in denying a
summary judgment motion in this same case. See Lloyd v. Loefiler, 518 F. Supp. 720, 725
(E.D. Wis. 1981).
295. 539 F. Supp. at 1004; see supra text accompanying note 290.
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tody was a violation of a Wisconsin criminal statute. 298 Third, the
district court concluded that Wisconsin would follow the precedents
of other jurisdictions that had already recognized the tort.297 The
court awarded the custodial father $70,038.45 as compensatory
damages2 8 and $25,000, to be increased by $2,000 per month for
each month the mother continued to hold the child, as a punitive
damage award.299
Courts may be providing an additional deterrent to child
snatching by permitting the custodial parent to recover monetary
damages from the noncustodial snatching parent. If the noncustodial
parent knows that courts will impose compensatory and punitive
damage awards, that parent may hesitate before snatching the child.
The threat of monetary sanctions may provide an incentive for the
noncustodial parent seeking custody of the child to petition the decree-issuing court for a modification of the custody determination.
Rather than resorting to illegal measures, the noncustodial parent
may try to gain custody of the child through the proper legal channels in the court that can best decide the issue-the child's home
state.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Both the UCCJA and the PKPA provide some measure of de296. 539 F. Supp. at 1004. See also Spencer v. Terebelo, 373 So. 2d 200 (La. App.
1979)(the Louisana Court of Appeals found that a kidnaping statute formed the basis of a
legal duty owed the custodial parent by the noncustodial pirent not to deprive him illegally of
the child's custody; breach of that duty constituted an actionable tort).
297. 539 F. Supp. at 1004. See, e.g., Fenslage v. Dawkins, 629 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir.
1980); Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
298. 539 F. Supp. at 1006. This award was to cover the father's expenses for two private
investigators ($7,517.35), attorney's fees ($709), two visits to Milwaukee in connection with
the private investigations ($591.34), long distance telephone charges ($120.76), lost wages incurred during the Milwaukee trip ($400), emotional difficulties ($30,000), loss of society of his
daughter ($25,000), psychological treatment fees ($4,400), and future psychological treatment
fees ($1,300). Id. at 1003.
299. Id. at 1005. The Court of Appeals questioned the validity of the district court's
subject fnatter jurisdiction to impose an "escalating punitive damage award" on the snatching
parent. Since the snatching parent was not a party to the appeal and could not challenge the
award, the court doubted its jurisdiction to vacate that part of the award. The court, however,
did not want its affirmance of the decision to be interpreted as an approval of this type of
damage award. Lloyd v. Loeffiler, 694 F.2d 489, 494 (7th Cir. 1982). The snatching mother
was not a party to either the original suit or the appeal. Although she was a named defendant,
she defaulted and never appeared in court. The suit proceeded against the maternal grandparents who were also implicated in the snatching incident. See 539 F. Supp. 998 (E. D. Wis.
1982). See also 518 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Wis. 1981)(grandparents' motion for summary judgment denied).
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terrence to child snatching. By providing a mechanism for a court to
decline jurisdiction in instances of child snatching, both statutes
make it difficult for the snatching parent to relitigate the custody of
the child in another forum.300 However, the operation of the provisions of both statutes is dependent upon the noncustodial parent's
attempt to relitigate custody in another forum.
The recognition by the courts that the noncustodial snatching
parent is liable for damages to the custodial parent may also provide
a deterrence to child snatching.30 1 The custodial parent can recover
not only the actual expenses incurred in attempts to locate the child
and regain custody, but also exemplary damages that serve as a punishment for the snatching parent. With the knowledge that the custodial parent can recover large monetary sums, the noncustodial parent might reconsider his actions before snatching the child and seek
to obtain custody through the proper legal channels.
Perhaps the only possible hope for the elimination of child
snatching lies in the enactment of stronger criminal laws by both the
federal and the state legislatures. The threat of possible fines, imprisonment, or both, may stop the noncustodial parent from taking the
child in violation of a valid custody decree.302 Parents must be made
aware that the states and the federal government will not tolerate
parental kidnaping. Only through the cooperation of all of the states
and the federal government can aid be given to the real victim of
this horrendous and emotionally disturbing crime-the snatched
child.
BarbaraSheryl Silverman

300.

See supra text accompanying notes 71-105, 201-35.

301.

See supra text accompanying notes 277-99.

302.

See supra text accompanying notes 236-67.
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